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ABSTRACT

Section 103 of the InternalRevenue Code providesfor the exclusion
from gross income of interest received on certain state and local bonds.
The exclusion of state bond interestfrom gross income has its roots in
the Constitution,but now is present in the InternalRevenue Code as an
indirectfederal subsidy to state and local governments. The subsidy is
achieved by allowing state and local governments to borrowfunds at
lower interest rates than would be available under normal market
conditions. However, the section 103 subsidy is inefficient and inequitable: inefficient because the benefit is notfully realized by state and local
governments, and what is lost goes to wealthy taxpayers; inequitable
because it favors the wealthy over the poor In this Article the author
examines the mechanics and history of the exclusion, reasons for and
against the subsidy, andpast proposalsfor its reform. He concludes by
proposinga Credit-Equityplan that is both efficient and equitable, and
that would attractadditionalbuyers into the bond market.
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INTRODUCTION

The recent explosion in the construction of new sports stadiums has
focused increased attention on the device used to finance the projects:
bonds issued by state governments.' Several articles discuss how to
reform the bond financing provisions so that the financial and economic
benefit will not end up in the hands of team owners or players, but these
articles do not address the overall problems inherent in state bonds.'
("State bonds," when used in this Article, refers to bonds issued by
States and local city, county, or municipal governments.)3 Other recent

1. In this Article the term "state government" will be used to refer to both State and local
government entities issuing bonds to finance various projects.
2. See Daniel J. Lathrope, Federal Tax Policy, Tax Subsidies, and the Financing of
ProfessionalSports Facilities,38 S. TEX. L. REV. 1147, 1162-64 (1997); Dennis Zimmerman,
Tax-Exempt Bonds and the Economics of ProfessionalSports Stadiums (Cong. Res. Service Rep.
1996), reprintedin TAX NOTES TODAY, May 30, 1996, available in WL 96 TNT 106-53. These
articles highlight the problems which are present in the exclusion, where federal taxpayers are
helping to finance purely private projects. For example, the use of state bonds has not led to
increased employment or property tax collected. See Michael J. Stutzer, The Statewide Economic
Impact of Small-Issue IndustrialRevenue Bonds, 9 FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINN. Q. REV. 2,
2, 7 (1985). The lack of increased employment is due primarily to several factors: (1) intrastate
competition exists, so the firms which are helped by the bond compete with and harm already
existing firms; (2) the bonds reduce the cost of capital, so the assisted firms have an incentive
to use capital instead of labor in making their product; (3) interstate competition exists such that
firms may just be moving around from state to state with no overall gain in employment or
property taxes collected. See id. at 3-6. On professional sports team relocation, see also
Katherine C. Leone, No Team, No Peace: Franchise Free Agency in the National Football
League, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 516-23 (1997) (calling for the elimination of tax-exempt bond
financing for stadiums); Matthew J. Mitten & Bruce W. Burton, ProfessionalSports Franchise
Relocations From Private Law and Public Law Perspectives: Balancing Marketplace
Competition, League Autonomy and the Need for a Level PlayingField, 56 MD. L. REV. 57,61,
128-48 (1997) (discussing the inadequacy of public law to react to the rash of professional sports
teams relocation and how lawmakers might try to stop leagues from using their monopoly power
to extract money from cities); Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., The Antitrust Rationalefor the Expansion
of ProfessionalSports Leagues, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1677, 1679-80 (1996).
3. A band is essentially a loan from the purchaser of the bond to the seller. It does not
provide any equity interest in the seller's property (like stock). For example, on the purchase of
a state bond, one can expect to get their money back, but does not have a part interest in the
State capital building. Usually, bond interest is paid periodically during the period the band is
outstanding, and these are called coupon payments (since bands used to have coupons attached
which were clipped as payments were due). The date on which the band principal is returned
is called the maturity date, and marks the total life of the band from the date of its issuance. See
ROBERT ZP, How MUNICIPAL BONDS WORK 2 (1995); see also JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN
ELUOT GOODMAN, DiCrONARY OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 349-50 (4th ed. 1995).
State bands normally require a larger minimum investment than corporate bonds. See WALL
STREET JOURNAL, GUME TO UNDERSTANDING MONEY & INVESTING 103 (1993).
Some other terms used for bands:
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articles discuss the overall equity of the tax system, some using taxexempt bonds as an example of how the tax system is inequitable.4 This
Article addresses this inequity and proposes changes to state bonds that
will make them both more efficient in nature and equitable to all
taxpayers.
Due to the pressure on state governments to reduce (or at least not
to increase) taxes, many state projects are financed through the use of
state bonds. These projects include the construction of highways,
bridges, schools, sewer systems, and many other facilities required by
the public.5 The interest from state bonds can be exempted from federal
income taxation by section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as amended (Code).6 This exemption allows state governments to
borrow funds at a lower interest rate, but keeps the bonds attractive to
buyers in comparison with taxable (primarily corporate) bonds.7 As an
example, assume a $10,000 taxable bond with 10% annual interest, for
which a bondholder receives a $1000 yearly interest payment A
taxpayer with a 39.6% marginal federal tax rate9 will pay tax of $396

Interest rate: This is the percentage of par value that is paid to the bond holder. Payments
are normally made semi-annually. Bonds that pay no interest until the maturity date are called
zero coupon bonds.
Par value: The dollar amount of the bond at the time it was issued.
Yield: The percentage amount the bond's interest pays in relation to its purchase price. The
yield of a bond is determined by (annual interest) - (price paid for bond). See id. at 85-87.
4. See, e.g., Deborah M. Weiss, Tax Incentives Without Inequity, 41 UCLA L. REV.
1949, 1955-74 (1994).
5. See Statement of David M. Thompson: Hearing on the Tax Reform Act of 1986
Before the House Committee on Ways and Means (1990), reprintedin TAX NOTES TODAY, Mar.
6, 1990, available in LEXIS 90 TNT 50-95. Over $250 billion dollars of new issue municipal
bonds were sold in 1993. ZiPF, supra note 3,at xi.
6. "Except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not include interest on any
State or local bond." I.R.C. § 103(a) (1994). Unless otherwise specified, all references in this
Article to a section of the Code are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 33-39. The average percentage differential between
state and taxable bonds was 2.15% between 1987 and 1995. BUREAu OF CENsus, U.S. DEP'T
OF COM., STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE U.S. 1996, at 522, No. 804 (116th ed. 1996). This
difference in the yield between state and taxable bonds also is called the "implicit tax rate." See
Lawrence Kryzanowski et al., Determinants of the DecreasingTerm Structure of Relative ield
Spreadsfor Taxable and Tax-Exempt Bonds, 27 APPLIED ECON. 583, 583 (1995). State bonds
now yield about 6%. In the 1970s the yield was 5 to 6% and the early 80s the range was 9 to
13%. See ZIPF, supra note 3, at 50.
8. The interest payment (yield) would be calculated by multiplying the par value of the
bond ($10,000) by the interest rate (10%) ($10,000 * 0.10 = $1000).
9. A taxpayer's "marginal rate" of tax is the rate at which the taxpayer's last tax dollar
is taxed (i.e., what the tax is at the "margin' or the outside limit). See DONALD RUTHERFORD,
DICrIONARY OF ECONOMICS 285 (1992). This is compared with a taxpayer's "average" or
"effective" tax, which is the rate at which all dollars are taxed. See id at 24. The average tax
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on the $1000 of income, and therefore will receive $604 in interest
income after federal taxes."0 This means that a tax-exempt bond must
pay only $604 in interest payments (6.04% interest)" yearly on the
same amount of principal to be as attractive as the taxable bond to a
taxpayer with a 39.6% marginal tax rate. The taxable income lost to the
federal government due to the exemption of state bond interest is an
indirect subsidy to state governments,12 and the amount of the subsidy
is the amount of tax lost due to section 103. In the above example, if
the bonds were tax-exempt, the federal subsidy to the issuing state
government would be $396 per year.
The exclusion of state bond interest from a taxpayer's gross
income 3 under section 103 was originally thought to be required by
the Constitution.' 4 However, the Supreme Court has stated that the
Sixteenth Amendment to the Constitution 5 permits the taxation of state
bond interest, thus putting aside any constitutional challenge to the
repeal of section 103 and to the repeal of the exclusion of state bond
interest. 6 The main reason section 103 exists today is because it

rate will always be different, and lower, for all brackets except the lowest.
The tax rates are set out by I.R.C. §§ I and 11. Section 1 provides rates for individuals, and
estates and trusts. It gives rates of 15%, 28%, 31%, 36% and 39.6%, with the rates ascending
(or "progressing") with greater amounts of taxable income. See I.R.C. § 1. Section 11 applies
to corporations and provides for rates of 15%, 25%, 34% and 35%, in the same ascending
manner. See I.R.C. § 11.
In this Article, a "tax" will always refer to federal tax rates and not to any possible state tax
which also might be assessed on the interest income received.
10. Taxpayer's tax liability will equal $396 since there is $1000 (interest income) against
which the tax rate of 39.6% must be applied ($1000 * .396 = $396). This calculation excludes
any itemized or standard deduction, or any personal exemptions or tax credits that the taxpayer
might possess. See I.R.C. §§ 21, 22, 26, 31, 32, 38, 42, 63(a) & (b), 151, pt. VI (161-197) and
pt. VII (211-219).
11. While the interest on state bonds is normally compounded semi-annually, in the
examples all interest calculations will assume annual compounding for simplicity.
12. See Leon Gabinet, The MunicipalBond InterestExemption: Comments on a Running
Battle, 24 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 64, 66 (1972).
13. "Gross income" is defined in I.R.C. § 61(a) as "all income from whatever source
derived" unless otherwise provided in subtitle A (Income Taxes) of Title 26 (Internal Revenue
Code). I.R.C. § 61(a). "Income" is defined as the "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly
realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion." Commissioner v. Glenshaw
Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
14. See infra text accompanying notes 83-134.
15. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
16. See South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 527 (1988); see also infra text
accompanying notes 128-33. But see Maxwell A. Miller & Mark A. Glick, The Resurgence of
Federalism:The Casefor Tax-Exempt Bonds, I TEX. REV. L. & POL. 25, 27, 50-57 (1997).
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provides a federal subsidy for state projects, such as the construction of
schools, roads, and sewers. The subsidy is deemed necessary because
many state projects provide "public goods" that would be underprovided
by the states if a federal subsidy were not given. 7 The federal subsidy
to state governments provided by section 103, however, is both
inefficient and inequitable, and any subsidy for state governments could
effectively be carried out in a different manner.
Section 103 is inefficient because a portion of the benefit of the
exclusion of state bond interest from gross income goes to high taxbracket taxpayers, while state governments receive no additional
subsidy. To illustrate, assume the same facts as in the example above.
If an insufficient number of taxpayers in the 39.6% bracket wish to
purchase state bonds, the state government must make its bonds
attractive to taxpayers in the next lower bracket. This would require
providing $640 in interest payments (6.4% interest) to attract taxpayers
in the 36% bracket. This higher interest rate allows the 36% bracket
taxpayers to receive the same amount of income after-tax on a $10,000
tax-exempt bond as they would from a taxable bond with 10% interest
taxed at 36%.18 Since the market for bonds is non-differentiated and
state governments cannot specify in which bracket a taxpayer may
receive a given interest payment, a windfall benefit is provided to the
39.6% bracket taxpayer.19 Now the taxpayer in the 39.6% bracket is
receiving 0.36% interest above the 6.04% interest required to make the
investment attractive. This is an additional $36 received tax-free on the
investment of those taxpayers," an amount on which the federal
government cannot assess tax, and which does not provide any
additional subsidy to the issuing state government, except to provide for
the sale of more bonds." Because state governments do not save in

17. A public good is one in which: (1) the consumption of the good cannot be given to
only those who pay, and (2) the good is such that one person's use does not interfere with
another person's consumption of that same good. See infra notes 194-96 and accompanying text.
18. After tax, the 36% marginal rate taxpayer would have $640 from a 10% annual
interest payment, $10,000 bond. This would be calculated by taking the interest payment
($1000), multiplied by the tax rate (36%), or $360. After paying the tax from the $1000 received
from the taxable bond, the taxpayer would have $640 remaining after-tax.
19. Another way to look at this would be that the market yield is determined by the
marginal investor (here the 36% taxpayer), and taxpayers in higher brackets reap the benefit (the
taxpayers in the 39.6% bracket).
20. This amounts to an additional 5.96% of interest ($36 additional interest divided by
$604) for the bondholder.
21. This sale of additional bonds could be completed without giving a windfall to
taxpayers in higher marginal tax brackets. See infra text accompanying notes 199-309.
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borrowing costs the additional amount which the federal government
gives up in lost revenue, the subsidy is inefficient.'
Section 103 is also inequitable. Some of the subsidy escapes to
higher bracket taxpayers (who are relatively wealthy) while this benefit
is not allowed for lower bracket taxpayers (who probably are middle
class or relatively poor). The tax equity argument "is based upon the
respectable proposition that a progressive income tax should not
countenance leakages and preferences which erode the tax base and
reduce its progressivity to the advantage of the wealthy."' One of the
fundamental premises upon which our tax system is based-progressive
taxation-requires that the rich should pay a higher percentage in tax on
their income than the poor should pay, and the rich should bear more of
the burden of funding the government. 24
There have been various attempts to repeal or replace section 103
since the state bond interest exclusion was enacted in 1913.' One plan
proposed to give state governments the election to sell taxable bonds,
with a portion of the interest paid by the state governments being
refunded back to the states by the federal government.26 This is to be
an undesirable replacement because it invokes concerns regarding
America's federalist system.27 Another proposal popular in the 1950s
would have increased the state bond interest income of taxpayers to the

22. See Gabinet, supra note 12, at 66. See infra note 145 and accompanying text for
inefficiency argument regarding § 103.
23. Gabinet, supra note 12, at 67.
24. See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Casefor Progressive Taxation
3, 19 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 419 (1952); see also Donna M. Byrne, Progressive Taxation
Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 742, 765-71 (1995). But see Joseph Bankman & Thomas
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL.
L. REV. 1905 (1987).
A progressive tax system is a system where the total tax imposed. represents a
greater percentage of income for high-income taxpayers than for lower-income
taxpayers. A tax is progressive or not in relation to income, or in relation to
wealth, or in relation to aggregate personal consumption. A judgment about
progressivity depends on how the base is defined, and income for the purpose of
judging progressivity is often defined differently-usually more broadly-than
taxable income. Whether our present income tax is actually progressive in relation
to a more comprehensive base is not clear.
Richard D. Hole, Note, The Continuing Debate Over the MunicipalBond Exemption: T"me for
a New Approach by Reformists, 25 SYRACUSE L. REV. 953, 961 n.38 (1974) (citing W.
ANDREWS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 18 (1969)); RUTHERFORD, supra note 9, at 370.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 200-78.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 200-40.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 226-41.
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level where it would have been had they purchased taxable bonds, then
would have taxed the total, and finally would have decreased the

resulting tax liability by the difference between the amount of constructive taxable income and the state bond income actually received." This
plan also is undesirable due to its complexity in calculation and
implementation.

Instead of promoting complex reforms or ones that create federalism
concerns, this Article proposes a Credit-Equity plan to replace the

section 103 exclusion of state bond interest from a taxpayer's gross
income. This plan would be easily implemented, efficient, equitable, and
would not invoke any of the federalism concerns that are present in the
state interest refund proposals. The Credit-Equity plan is simple, because
all it entails is the creation of an equality factor9 for each taxpayer to
multiply against tax-exempt income and then either increase or decrease
tax liability accordingly. The equality factor would prevent any
additional subsidy ($36 in the above example) from being received by
the higher bracket taxpayers, while still attracting bond buyers from the

lower tax brackets."°

The proposed plan is efficient, because the entire amount of the
subsidy would be provided to the states, without any leakage to wealthy
taxpayers. The Credit-Equity plan also is equitable because all taxpayers
would receive the same effective interest rate as if they had purchased
a comparable taxable bond. Finally, no federalism concerns are present
because the 31
federal government would not be providing funds directly
to the states.
28. See infra text accompanying notes 242-78.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 279-310, and app.
30. The Credit-Equity plan should not affect the market for either taxable or state bonds.
See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH 44-48 (3d ed.
1993). This is because both have the same effective after-tax yield. See infra tbl. 3 accompanying notes 290-92. Economic theory suggests that consumer preference is convex, or that
consumers (here bond buyers) faced with a choice between two goods will select some of each,
instead of purchasing all of one or the other. See VARIAN, supra, at 48. Even without the
windfall subsidy from the federal government, many of the higher-bracket taxpayers would
purchase state bonds due to their security. See ZIPF, supra note 3, at 75. Zipf concludes that
state bonds would still be an attractive investment since "few corporations have the power to
levy taxes, nor do many businesses offer essential public services that no one can do without
and for which the business can charge any reasonable price it wishes to charge." Id.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 224-40. One example of an indirect subsidy that
would be allowed when a direct subsidy would be disallowed is the charitable deduction for
contributions to churches. See Todd Izzo, A Full Spectrum of Light: Rethinking the Charitable
Contribution Deduction, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 2371, 2383-85 (1993); Peter J. Wiedenbeck,
Charitable Contributions: A Policy Perspective, 50 Mo. L. REV. 85,95 (1985). Cf. Walz v. Tax
Comm., 397 U.S. 664 (1969) (allowing for New York City's property tax exemption to religious
organizations). But see E.C. Lashbrooke Jr., An Economic and Constitutional Case for Repeal
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Part I of this Article discusses why state governments use tax-exempt
bonds, then it explains the mechanics of section 103 and other pertinent
Code sections on the subject of tax-exempt bond financing. Part IT
discusses the historical background of section 103 of the Internal
Revenue Code. Part I presents various reasons why section 103 should
be abolished. Part IV discusses the various reasons why a subsidy
should be provided for state projects. Part V deals with past proposals
for the abolition and reform of section 103. Part VI discusses the
proposed Credit-Equity plan as a replacement of the state subsidy
currently provided by section 103, and Part VII concludes the Article.
I. THE MECHANICS OF SECTION 103
A. Why Are Tax-Exempt Bonds Desirable to
State Governments?
A fundamental question that should be answered before going further
is why do state governments care whether purchasers of their bonds can
exclude state bond interest from gross income?32 Because state governments are paying interest, it could be said that they are not receiving
any benefit from the tax exemption being offered to the purchaser. The
answer, of course, is that the interest exemption allows the sellers of the
bonds to offer a lower interest rate and yet be competitive in the
marketplace with taxable bonds. The 'state governments save the
difference between the interest rate of state bonds and the higher interest
rate for taxable bonds. Because of the resulting loss to federal revenue,
this amounts to an indirect federal subsidy to state governments.
of the I.R.C. Section 170 Deductionfor CharitableContributionsto Religious Organizations,27
DUQ. L. REv. 695, 715-19 (1989).
32. In contrast, interest from bonds issued by the United States has been subject to federal
taxation since 1917. See HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969, H.R.
REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 172 (1969), reprintedin 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1645, 1826
[hereinafter WAYS AND MEANS REPORT]; BORIS BrrrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL
TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFS 15.1 (1989). However, in 1988 Congress enacted
§ 135, which provides that the interest paid on certain federal bonds is excludable from gross
income if the bond is used to pay for qualifying higher education expenses. I.R.C. § 135(a).
33. See J. MARTIN BURKE & MICHAEL K. FRIEL, TAXATION OF INDIVIDUAL INCOME 207
(4th ed. 1997); BrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 1 15.2.1. 'Ihe exemption from Federal
income tax of interest income on state and local bonds is the cardinal feature in determining the
demand for these securities." Harvey Galper & John Petersen, An Analysis of Subsidy Plansto
Support State and Local Borrowing, 24 NAT'L TAX J. 205, 208 (1971).
The Internal Revenue Service explains the subsidy function of § 103 like this:
Suppose the City of Smithville needs to raise $10 million to construct a new city
hail. The city determines to issue $10 million of general obligation bonds with a
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The best way to explain this is by example. Suppose a taxpayer

purchases a $1000 taxable bond which provides 10% interest per year
(compounded annually), for a yield of $100.' If the taxpayer is taxed
at a marginal rate of 40%,"s he will have $60 in after-tax income.'
All other factors being equal, therefore, the taxpayer should be
indifferent to the purchase of a state bond versus a taxable bond if the
state bond carries an interest rate of at least 6% and the yield is exempt
from tax.' In that case, the state bond would yield interest of $60,
none of which is taxable under section 103, and the taxpayer would
have the exact same amount of after-tax income as compared with a
10% taxable bond.3" In this way, the state government that issued the
bond has not had to pay the extra $40 to attract purchasers of its bonds
20-year maturity for the project. All the principal will be paid in 20 years, and [sic]
interest will be paid semiannually. If the city can issue the bonds on a tax-exempt
basis, the interest rate on the bonds will be 6 percent; if the city had to issue the
bonds on a taxable basis, the interest rate would be 8 percent. In this case the city
will benefit $200,000 each year that the bonds are outstanding (the city saves 2
percent of $10 million in interest cost each year). The present value of this benefit
at the taxable discount rate of 8 percent is about 2 million. That is, on these facts,
the city receives a subsidy of about 20 percent of the cost of the project....
How much does this subsidy cost the federal government? If the city had to
issue taxable bonds, the holders would be subject to tax on interest income of
$800,000 each year the bonds were outstanding. Assume that all of these holders
paid tax at a marginal rate of 30 percent. In this case lost tax revenues would be
$240,000 each year. The present value of this cost at a taxable discount rate of 8
percent is about $2.4 million.
Internal Revenue Service, IRS Exempt Organization CPE Textbook Chapter N: Tax-Exempt
Bonds CurrentTopics (Oct. 1, 1994), reprintedin TAX NOTES TODAY, Sept. 12, 1994, available
in LEXIS 94 TNT 179-101, 2-4.
34. $1000 (bond) * 10% (interest) = $100 (yield).
35. Presently under I.R.C. § 1, the maximum rate is 39.6%. 40% is used for simplicity of
calculation and clarity.
36. $100 (interest income) - $40 (tax) = $60

37. This is somewhat simplified since it does not take into account any possible
Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) which might be owed by the taxpayer under § 55-59. See
I.R.C. §§ 55-59. However, certain state bonds are excluded from calculation of AMT. See I.R.C.
§ 57(a)(5). Also, various other economic factors may come into play in the pricing of state
bonds, such as the desire of the taxpayer to receive a "windfall" subsidy of $36 discussed in the
first example. See supra text accompanying note 20; BrITKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32,
15.2.1 n.3.
38. This can be stated algebraically. Let B, represent the interest rate received on taxexempt bonds, B, the interest rate received on taxable bonds, and R the taxpayer's marginal tax
rate. A taxpayer will purchase tax-exempt state bonds if B, > (1 - R)B,. Solving for (1 - R) we
see that a taxpayer will purchase tax-exempt state bonds when B, / B, > (1 - R). See Frank E.
Morris, Tax Exemption for State and Local Bonds, 42 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 526, 530 n. It
(1974); app., infra.
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because of the bond's tax-exempt status. This amounts to a federal
subsidy to the states. 9 While there are some restrictions on the uses of
tax-exempt bonds, states generally are free to use the money received
for their bonds in any way they choose.'
There are, however, many factors that go into calculating the rates
of bonds, so a direct comparison between tax-exempt bonds and taxable
bonds cannot be completed with any real precision.41 The interest rate
at any moment will vary with factors such as the general availability of
credit, the demand for credit, the proportionate demand by state
governments to the total market demand for credit, changes in interest
rates, changes in the tax rate, supply of investment funds, and other
conditions.42
B. The Mechanics of Section 103
State bonds may either be issued for a general or a specific purpose.
A general purpose bond may be issued for any lawful purpose. A
specific purpose bond is one issued for a specific project, such as
schools, fire departments, and professional sports stadiums.43 The
source of payment for principal and interest on state bonds can be the
state government's general tax revenue or the revenue of the specific
project. Bonds paid from general tax revenues are "general obligation
(GO) bonds."" Bonds
paid from the revenue of the specific project are
"revenue bonds."45 The exclusion of state bond interest provided by
Section 103 can apply to state bonds which are issued for either a

39. "The subsidy [to state governments] actually constitutes the difference between the
interest costs paid by the States... in carrying their indebtedness under the existing tax
exemption and the costs which would be incurred if the interest were made taxable." Vance N.
Kirby, State and Local Bond Interest, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess.,
1 TAX REv. COMPENDIUM 679, 686 (1959).
40. See infra text accompanying notes 57-80 (discussing the federal limitations to taxexempt bond financing).
41. See, e.g., LYLE C. FITCH, TAXING MUNICIPAL BOND INCOME (1950); Lucile Derrick,
Exemption of Security Interest from Income Taxes in the United States: An Economic and
StatisticalAnalysis, 16 J. Bus. U. CHI. No. 4, Pt. 2, 30 (1946); Kirby, supra note 39, at 686. For
calculation of bond prices, see FITCH, supra, at 75; ZIPF, supra note 3, at 115-26.
42. See WAYS AND MEANs REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826; FITCH, supra note 41, at 828; Kirby, supra note 39, at 686; James Maxwell, Exclusionsfrom Income ofInterest on State
and Local Government Obligations, I TAX REv. COMPENDIUM 701, 708 (1959).
43. ZIPF, supra note 3, at 134.

44. See ROBERT S. AMDURSKY & CLAYTON P. GILLETrE, MUNICIPAL DEBT FINANCE

LAW, THEORY AND PRACrnE 25-29 (1992); ZiPF, supra note 3, at 134.
45. See ZIPF, supra note 3, at 134; see also AMDURSKY & GILLETrE, supra note 44, at
29-33.
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general or specific purpose.46 Additionally, both GO and revenue bonds
may qualify for the state bond interest exclusion under section 103,
regardless of how the bonds are funded.47 There are significant
restrictions to the allowance under section 103 for state bonds issued for
certain purposes, and for certain revenue bonds.
Section 103(a) excludes from a taxpayer's gross income interest
received on state bonds.4 The general rule in section 103(a) is subject
to several exceptions listed in section 103(b).' The exceptions to the
general rule of exclusion are for interest received from (1) nonqualified
private activity bonds, (2) arbitrage bonds, and (3) bonds not in
registered form.5' In addition, the Code prevents a taxpayer from
deducting expenses (e.g., interest or fees) incurred in the purchase of
tax-exempt state bonds.

46. See AMDURSKY & GILLETIE, supra note 44, at 462-63.
47. See ZiPF, supra note 3, at 134.
48. "Except as provided in subsection (b), gross income does not include interest on any
State or local bond." I.R.C. § 103(a). While § 103(a) states that the exclusion only applies to
a "bond," § 103(c)(1) defines a "state or local bond" as "an obligation of a state or political
subdivision thereof." I.R.C. § 103(c)(1). Additionally, a "State" is defined by the Code to
include "the District of Columbia and any possession of the United States." I.R.C. § 103(c)(2).
This makes § 103(a) fairly broad and it can apply to any obligation (even ordinary commercial
debts) of any State, territory, or U.S. possession regardless of whether it is evidenced by a bond
or not. See BrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 1 15.2.2, at 15-4; see also Lee Ann Pierce, Tax
Exempt Bonds, 32 S.D. L. REV. 518, 519-24 (1987) (describing characteristics of bonds with
taxable interest). Indian tribal governments also are able to issue tax-exempt bonds. I.R.C. §
7871(c)(1). Section 7701(a)(40) defines "Indian tribal governments." I.R.C. § 7701(a)(40). Even
though the interest is excluded from gross income it still must be reported on the taxpayer's tax
return. See I.R.C. § 6012(d).
The Code does not exclude from gross income the gains on the sale or other disposition of
otherwise exempt securities. See I.R.C. § 1001(a), (c); cf. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3).
49. I.R.C. § 103(b)(1)-(3).
50. Id. Arbitrage bonds include any bond issued in which any portion of the proceeds are
used to acquire or replace funds used to purchase higher yielding investments. See I.R.C. §
148(a). Arbitrage bonds will not be discussed at length in this Article. For a discussion of
arbitrage bonds, see BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 1 15.5; Internal Revenue Service, IRS
Exempt OrganizationsCPE TechnicalInstruction ProgramTextbook, ChapterP: The FirstBook
of Arbitrage--Overview,reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 13, 1994, available in LEXIS,
94 TNT 71-51; Thompson Statement, supra note 5.
51. I.R.C. § 265(a)(1)-(2). The Internal Revenue Service (Service) also takes the position
that expenses paid with tax-exempt income are non-deductible. See Rev. Rul. 83-3, 1983-1 C.B.
72. Additionally, tax-exempt interest is included in determining the amount of social security
benefits to be included in a taxpayer's gross income, see I.R.C. § 86(b)(2)(B), and for computing
the alternative minimum tax see I.R.C. § 57(a)(5).
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1. Private Activity Bonds
As a reaction to perceived abuses, Congress created exceptions to the
general rule of exclusion of state bond interest from gross income.52
One abuse was the utilization of tax-exempt bonds to fund projects
ultimately used by private business. 53 State governments increased their
use of tax-exempt bonds after the 1944 decision in Commissioner v.
Shamberg's Estate.' which permitted the exclusion from gross income
of interest from bonds issued by a municipality, even though interest
and principal were paid by a private business.' The private business
did not have the power to levy tax or assessments.56 This decision led
the way to the greater use of "industrial development bonds," in which

52. Until 1969 the Internal Revenue Code included only the wording in § 103(a)(1):
"Gross income does not include interest on (1) the obligations of a State, a Territory, or a
possession of the United States, or any political subdivision of any of the foregoing, or of the
District of Columbia." I.R.C. § 103(a) (1968). See Dennis Zimmerman, Tax-Exempt Bonds: A
Sacred Cow that Gave (Some) Milk, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 283 (1989). Section 103 was unmodified
from the wording in § 103(a) for the first 50 years of its existence. See Dennis Davie & Bruce
Zimmerman, Tax-Exempt Bonds After the South Carolina Decision, 39 TAx NoTES 1573, 1577
(June 27, 1988). For a discussion of the background and implications of the changes to taxexempt bond financing in the 1980s, see Michael Livingston, Reform or Revolution? Tax-Exempt
Bonds, the Legislative Process, and the Meaning of Tax Reform, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1165
(1989).
53. The first use of public money to finance private projects occurred between 1820-1830
when state governments used debt financing to build private banks and railroads. The money
received from the private projects was supposed to pay off the debt instruments. This use of
public money stopped, however, when these projects could not meet the debt obligations due
to periods of recession. The use of bonds to fund any type of industrial development did not
occur again until 1936 in Mississippi and several other southern states. Davie & Zimmerman,
supra note 52, at 1576.
54. 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 792 (1945). Shamberg's Estate
was a test case by the Bureau of Internal Revenue that was "intended ultimately to prove in the
courts that the federal government has the right under the Constitution to tax income from state
and municipal securities." Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury, 47 (1941). See
GEORGE LENT, THE OWNERSHIP OF TAX ExEMPT SECURMITIES, 1913-1953,25 Occasional Paper,
National Bureau of Economic Research (1955).
55. See Shamberg's Estate, 144 F.2d at 999.
56. Id. at 1000, 1004. Shamberg's Estate dealt with bonds Mr. Shamberg purchased from
the Port of New York Authority (Port Authority) and his claim that the interest from the bonds
was exempt from tax. Id. at 999. The Port Authority was created by a compact between the
states of New York and New Jersey to build public roads and tunnels. i at 1000-01. While the
Port Authority did have authority to issue bonds, it did not have any power to levy taxes or
assessments. Id. at 1000. This lack of power to tax led the Commission of Internal Revenue to
challenge whether the Port Authority was a "political subdivision" within the meaning of §
22(b)(4) (presently codified as I.R.C. § 103(c)(1)). Id. at 1003. If the Port Authority was not a
"political subdivision" it would lack the ability to issue tax-exempt bonds and the interest
income would be taxable to Shamberg. Id. at 999.
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financing (interest and principal payments) for the state bonds was paid
from non-public projects that were entirely privately-owned and
privately-operated.57 In 1986, Congress labeled industrial development
bonds as "private activity bonds," severely restricting the states' ability
to obtain exemptions from taxation for bonds where the benefits inure
to private parties."

The lack of the exclusion for interest from private activity bonds
makes it desirable for state governments to either avoid having their
bonds categorized in this manner or to have them categorized as
"qualified" private activity bonds. 9 Section 141 of the Code defines a
private activity bond,6' and bonds so labeled fall into one of two
categories. First, under section 141(a)(1), a bond is a private activity
bond if it meets both the "private business use test" and the "private
security or payment test.",61 Second, under section 141(a)(2), those
bonds that meet the "private loan financing test" also will be classified
as private activity bonds.62

57. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 15.3.1. The Internal Revenue Service
approved of the use of industrial development bonds in Rev. Rul. 54-106, 1954-1 C.B. 28 and
Rev. Rul. 57-187, 1957-1 C.B. 65. See Joseph P. Martori & Harold J. Bliss, Jr., Taxation of
Municipal Bond Interest "InterestingSpeculation" and One Step Forward,44 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 191, 202 (1968); Stutzer, supra note 2, at 2. Stutzer writes: "IRBs are essentially corporate
bonds whose interest is exempt from federal income tax and, in several states, from state income
tax." Id.
58. See BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, § 15.3.1, at 15-14. The general rationale for
state governments to enter into these types of agreements is that they will create jobs. However,
this never has been substantiated, and conversely, it is thought by some to actually create fewer
jobs since it takes away the government's ability to fund efficient methods of creating jobs. See
id. at 15-13; see also Dennis Zimmerman, CRS Issues Report on Tax-Exempt Bond Legislation,
91 TAx NOTES TODAY 53-25, Mar. 8, 1991, availablein LEXIS, 91 TNT 53-25.
59. This fact is due to the higher interest rates which must be paid to buyers of bonds
which lack the interest exclusion.
60. I.R.C. § 141(a).
(a) PRIVATE ACI'vrrY BOND.-For purposes of this title, the term "private activity
bond" means any bond issued as part of an issue-

(1) which meets(A) the private business use test of paragraph (1) of subsection (b), and
(B) the private security or payment test of paragraph (2) of subsection (b),
or
(2) which meets the private loan financing test of subsection (c).
Id.
61. I.R.C. § 141(a)(1)(A)-(B); see also Dennis Zimmerman, Separating Public- and
Private-PurposeTax-Exempt Bonds, 31 TAX NOTES 509, 511 (May 5, 1986).
62. I.R.C. § 141(a)(2).
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With respect to the first of the above methods for determining
whether a bond is a private activity bond under section 141(a)(1), the
private business use test asks whether more than ten percent of the
proceeds of the issue are to be used for any private purpose.63 Application of the private security or payment test results in the finding of a
private activity bond "if the payment of the principal of, or the interest
on, more than [ten] percent of the proceeds of such issue is... directly
or indirectly" [1] secured by any interest in property used or to be used
for a private business or payments for such property, or [2] "to be
derived from payments.., in respect of property, or borrowed money,
used or to be used for a private business use."' This type of private
activity bond is the classic industrial development bond issue which
might finance such projects as a factory building to be constructed for
lease to private businesses."
The second way a bond may be classified as a private activity bond
is through the application of the private loan financing test.' Under the
private loan financing test, a bond is private if proceeds of the bond
issue are used to make or finance loans to persons other than government units and the portion used for such persons exceeds the lesser of
five percent of the proceeds or five million dollars.67 However, if the
loan enables the borrower to finance any governmental tax or assessment of general application for a specific essential governmental
function, or is a nonpurpose investment, then the test is not met.68 A
nonpurpose investment is one that is acquired with the gross proceeds
of an issue and is not required in order to carry out the governmental
purpose of the issue.69
Even if a bond is considered a private activity bond, it may
nonetheless retain its tax-exempt status. To do this the bond must either:
(1) be a "qualified" bond, with the total amount of the bond issue being
less than the dollar limitation or "cap" set by Congress;7 or (2) be a
section 501(c)(3) bond7 The Code provides a detailed list of what

63. I.R.C. § 141(b)(1).
64. I.R.C. § 141(b)(2).
65. BrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 9 15.3.1, at 15-15.
66. See I.R.C. § 141(a)(2).
67. See I.R.C. § 141(c)(1).
68. See I.R.C. § 141(c)(2).
69. See I.R.C. § 148(f)(6)(A).
70. See I.R.C. §§ 103(b)(1), 141(e), 146; see also Charles L. Vehom & Edward
Nannenhorn, Setting Limits on the Tax-Exempt Bond Market: Where Do We Go from Here?, 47
TAX NoTEs 1111, 1112-13 (May 28, 1990). To explore other possible methods for limiting the
issuance of state bond issued to fund private activities, see Davie & Zimmerman, supra note 52.
71. See I.R.C. § 141(b)(9).
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constitutes a "qualified" bond.72 These types of bonds are varied, and
whether they are qualified private activity bonds depends on the purpose
for which the bond proceeds are used. For example, bonds used to
finance sewage facilities or student loans may be deemed qualified.73

Additionally, the states are limited to a certain dollar amount of
qualified bonds outstanding during any calendar year; otherwise, the
interest from the bonds will not be tax-exempt.74 The purpose of this
requirement is to "control the total volume of tax-exempt bonds issued
for [private] activities" and to encourage states to look more closely at
the activities for which they issue qualified bonds.75
2. Arbitrage and Non-Registered Bonds
The other exceptions to the general rule of interest exclusion, other
than bonds labeled as private activity bonds, are arbitrage bonds and
certain non-registered bonds.7 6 The prohibition on arbitrage bonds was
added to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.' Arbitrage bonds
were made ineligible for the exemption from tax so that state govern72. See I.R.C. § 141(e). They are (1) an exempt facility bond (defined in I.R.C. § 142);
(2) a qualified mortgage bond (defined in I.R.C. § 143(a)); (3) a qualified veterans' mortgage
bond (defined in I.R.C. § 143(b)); (4) a qualified small issue bond (defined in I.R.C. § 144(a));
(5) a qualified student loan bond (defined in I.R.C. § 144(b)); (6) a qualified redevelopment
bond (defined in I.R.C. § 144(c)); or (7) a qualified 501(c)(3) bond (defined in I.R.C. § 145).
For a discussion of the qualifications of the various types of qualified bonds, see BrmER &
LOKKEN, supra note 32, Nj 15.4.1 to 15.4.9. Before the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, nonhospital § 501(c)(3) organizations were limited to a $150 million cap on the amount of bonds
they may have outstanding under I.R.C. § 145(b)(1). See Thompson Statement, supra note 5,
at 3. However, the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 repealed that provision for bonds issued after
August 5, 1997. See I.R.C. § 145(b)(5) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 105-34, Title II, § 222, 111
Stat. 818 (1997)).
73. See I.R.C. § 144.
74. See I.R.C. § 146(a). "General rule.-A private activity bond issued as part of an issue
meets the requirements of this section if the aggregate face amount of the private activity bonds
issued pursuant to such issue, when added to the aggregate face amount of tax-exempt private
activity bonds previously issued by the issuing authority during the calendar year, does not
exceed such authority's volume cap for such calendar year." Id.
One author suggests that the cap is too restrictive and states should be given the right to sell
their right to issue tax-exempt bonds. See Kirk Stark, Letting States Sell Their Right to Issue
Tax-Exempt Bonds, 61 TAx NOTES 1619 (Dec. 27, 1993).
75. STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAX'N, 99Th CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF
THE TAX REFORM Act OF 1986, at 1153 (Comm. Print 1987); see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra
note 32, 1 15.4.9.
76. I.R.C. § 103(b)(2)-(3). For a discussion on the Internal Revenue's viewpoints on
arbitrage bonds, see Internal Revenue Service, supra note 50.
77. See BORis I. BITTKER & MARTIN J. MCMAHON JR., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS [ 10.311] (1996). BITrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 1 15.5; sources cited supra
note 50.
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ments would not go into the private banking business.78 For example,
if a state government issued $1,000,000 in bonds at 6% interest compounded annually ($60,000) and then invested the proceeds in taxable
bonds that provided interest of 10% compounded annually ($100,000),
the state government would earn a profit of approximately $40,000 per
year.79 This could be accomplished at no additional risk if federal
obligations were purchased with the bond proceeds." And, of course,
because state governments are generally exempt from federal taxes, the
entire amount of gain would be profit.
The rationale for the registration requirement exception is to prevent
tax evasion. 1 Congress decided that unregistered bonds facilitate tax
evasion because they leave no paper trail, and believed that registration
would curb such evasion.82
As seen from the above, section 103, like many other Code sections,
is very complex. As will be discussed in Part III, this system of
taxation, or rather patchwork of non-taxation, results in an inefficient
distribution of the intended benefits and in an inequality among
taxpayers. But, section 103 does secure an important source of revenue
for state governments, ensuring state economic sovereignty. This means
Congress may inadvertently, or purposely, alter the fundamental balance
of power between the federal government and the states by altering the
state bond tax exemption system. Hence, a brief review of the history
of the doctrine of federalism which underlies section 103 is in order,
and is discussed in Part II of this Article.

78. BrirER & MCMAHON, supra note 77, 1 10.311].
79. Subsections (c) and (d) of § 148 provide exceptions to the general rule for arbitrage
bonds. Subsection (c) excludes bonds from being treated as arbitrage bonds if the proceeds of

the bonds are "invested in higher yielding investments for a reasonable temporary period until
such proceeds are needed for the purpose... issued." I.R.C. § 148(c). Subsection (d) allows for
10% of the proceeds to be invested for a "reasonably required reserve or replacement fund."
I.R.C. § 148(d)(1). This fund may exceed 10% if the issuer shows that it is necessary. See I.R.C.
§ 148(d)(2). Finally, § 148(e) allows for a de mininis portion to be invested in higher yielding

instruments, but not to exceed the lower of 5% of the bond issue or $100,000. See I.R.C. §
148(e)(I)-(2).
80. State and Local Government Series bonds are issued by state governments to avoid
the arbitrage restrictions. This is done by setting the interest rates on the bonds to avoid any
arbitrage problems. See ZIPF, supra note 3, at 90.
81. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 509 (1988) (citing Hearings on H.R. 6300
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 35 (1982)).
82. See infra text accompanying notes 128-33 (discussing South Carolina v. Baker). All
state bonds are not required to be registered. See I.R.C. § 149(a)(2). Those bonds which do not
require registration are (a) bonds of a type not offered to the public, (b) bonds which after being
issued mature in one year or less, and (c) bonds which are specified to be sold to only non-U.S.
persons under I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B). See id.
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL INcOME TAX EXEMPTION FOR
INCOME FROM STATE AND LOCAL

BONDS

A. Early Background
The federal tax exemption for interest on these bonds has a history
which predates the first Internal Revenue Code. 3 In 1894 Congress
imposed an income tax which taxed the interest received from state
bonds. 4 While this attempt was initially successful, the provision
allowing for the taxation of state bond interest, along with the entire
1894 Act, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.85 The Court used the doctrine
83. The first Internal Revenue Code was enacted by Congress in 1939. See JAMES J.
FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 6 (10th ed. 1998) (citing
CODIFICATION OF INTERNAL REVENUE LAW IX (1930), reproducedat 26 U.S.C.A. XIX-XX).
The first income tax was enacted by Congress in 1861 to finance the Civil War. See PAUL
R. MCDANIEL Er AL., INCOME TAXATION CASES AND MATERIALS 3 (1994); SIDNEY RATNER,
AMERICAN TAXATION: ITS HISTORY AS A SOCIAL FORCE IN DEMOCRACY 65-68 (1942);
RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION INTHE UNITED STATES 9-11 (1954). All income over $600 was
taxable. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 6 (3d ed. 1995). The $600 taxable income floor made the tax only
applicable.to 1% of the country. The tax rate was 3% tax for the first $10,000 and 5% on all
taxable income thereafter, and state bond interest was taxable. See id. at 6; RATNER, supra, at
66-67. The rate was reduced in 1867 and 1870, and repealed completely in 1872. See GRAETZ
& SCHENK, supra, at 6; MCDANIEL ET AL., supra, at 3; see also Davie & Zimmerman, supra
note 52, at 1575; Hole, supra note 24, at 954-59; Miller & Glick, supra note 16, at 42-47.
84. Fitch, supra note 41, at 3. The tax act created in 1894 was entitled "[a]n act to reduce
taxation, to provide revenue for the government, and for other purposes" and passed on August
15, 1894 [hereinafter 1894 Act]. See Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 431
(1895). The tax in 1894 was 2% of all income over $4,000. See GRAEIE & SCHENK, supra note
83, at 6. Even though state bond interest was taxable in 1894, two bills for the exclusion of
interest from income from state and local bonds were proposed in the Senate during discussion
of the 1894 Act, but not included. 53 CONG. REC. 6804 (1894); see Fitch, supra note 41, at 3.
85. 157 U.S. 429, 583, 586 (1895). In Pollock, the plaintiff was a stockholder of the
defendant and sued the company as a stockholder and as a representative of the other
stockholders of the company. litat 430. The complaint alleged the income tax passed by
Congress in 1894 was unconstitutional as a direct tax on income as prohibited by Article 1,
section 2, of the Constitution. Id at 432. The complaint also stated that the tax was unconstitutional because the 1894 Act taxed income, which the complaint said was "not taxable under the
Constitution... income derived from the stock and bonds of the states of the United States, and
counties and municipalities therein.. . ." Id. In the suit Pollock wanted to stop the defendant
company from voluntarily paying the tax due under the 1894 Act. Id at 433. The Supreme Court
held for Pollock and declared the 1894 Act unconstitutional and decided that state and local
bond interest could not be taxed under the Constitution, stating that "the tax in question is a tax
on the power of the States and their instrumentalities to borrow money, and consequently
repugnant to the Constitution." Id. at 586. The rest of the 1894 Act was declared unconstitutional
since it was a "direct tax" on income. Id. at 583. The Constitution states "[rlepresentatives and
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this
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of intergovermmental tax immunity86 to strike down the portion of the
1894 Act which applied to the taxation of state bonds. 7
The intergovernmental tax immunity doctrine had its beginnings in
McCulloch v. Maryland." McCulloch dealt with a state tax on the
Bank of the United States. 9 First, Justice Marshall determined that
Congress did possess the power under the Constitution to create a
national bank.9' Second, Justice Marshall pointed out that the Constitution contains no express provision limiting the ability of the states to tax
the federal government.9 However, Justice Marshall found that the
Constitution, by implication, created some limitations on the ability of
state governments to tax the federal government if that tax interfered
with the execution of the powers granted the federal government by the
Constitution.' Third, he determined that the Constitution, when looked
at in its entirety, created two separate and distinct sovereignties: the
states on the one hand, and the federal government on the other.93
Union... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3. The portion of the Pollock decision which invalidated
the income tax as a direct tax hastened the enactment of the 16th Amendment. See BrrFKER &
MCMAHON, supra note 77, 1.1[1][a]; George Lent, The Origin and Survival of Tax-Exempt
Securities, 12 NAT'L TAX J. 301, 303 (1959); Michael Neumark, The Taxability of State and
Local Bond Interest by the Federal Government, 38 CINN. L. REv. 703, 704 (1969).
86. The term "intergovernmental tax immunity" was first used by the Supreme Court in
Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 425 (1938). See also Lucretia Marie Adymy, Comment,
The Constitutionalityof FederalIncome Taxation of Interest Earnedon State MunicipalBonds,
50 ALB. L. REV. 55, 60 & n.41 (1985); Barry H. Feinberg, Comment, IntergovernmentalTax
Immunities, 15 VILL. L. REV. 414, 415-16 (1970); Lent, supra note 85, at 301-04.
87. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 586. The Court determined that taxing the income from state
bonds was an invasion on the sovereign powers of the States, which was not provided for by the
implications created by the Constitution. Id. at 585-86; see Kirby, supra note 39, at 680.
88. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see Lent, supra note 85, at 301; Miller & Glick, supra
note 16, at 42.
89. See id. at 317. The Bank of the United States was created by Congress on April 10,
1816. The Bank of the United States was taxed under a Maryland law imposing a tax on all
banks which were not chartered in Maryland. See id at 317-18.
90. See id. at 424-25.
91. See id. at 427.
92. Justice Marshall wrote:
If the states may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the execution
of its powers, they may tax any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail;
they may tax the mint; they may tax patent-rights.., they may tax judicial
process; they may tax all the means employed by the government, to an excess
which would defeat all the ends of government. This was not intended by the
American people. They did not design to make their government dependent on the
states.
Id. at 432.
93. See id. at 410. "In America, the powers of sovereignty are divided between the
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These sovereignties have defined powers and neither may interfere with

the powers provided to the other by the Constitution." Finally, another
concern of the Court was that a state tax on the federal government was

a tax on people who did not have adequate representation in the creation
of the tax.95 Chief Justice Marshall wrote that the state tax was
unconstitutional because it undermined the supremacy of the federal
government. In doing so he made his famous statement that "the power
to tax involves the power to destroy... ."' McCulloch was the first
case to deal with the immunity of one level of government from tax by
another.'
The McCulloch decision was later expanded reciprocally98 and

government of the Union, and those of the States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the
objects committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects committed to the
other." Id.
94. See id. at 429. Justice Marshall wrote:
The sovereignty of a State extends to everything which exists by its own
authority.., but does it extend to those means which are employed by Congress
to carry into execution-powers conferred on that body by the people of the United
States? We think it demonstrable that it does not. Those powers are not given by
the people of a single state. They are given by the people of the United States, to
a government whose laws, made in pursuance of the constitution, are declared to
be supreme. Consequently, the people of a single State cannot confer a sovereignty
which will extend over them.
Id.
95. See id. at 435-36.
The people of all the states, and the States themselves, are represented in Congress,
and, by their representatives, exercise this power. When they tax the chartered
institutions of the states, they tax their constituents; and these taxes must be
uniform. But, when a state taxes'the operations of the government of the United
States, it acts upon institutions created, not by their own constituents, but by people
over whom they claim no control. It acts upon the measures of a government
created by others as well as themselves, for the benefit of others in common with
themselves. The difference is that which always exists, and always must exist,
between the action of the whole on a part, and the action of a part on the
whole-between the laws of a government declared to be supreme, and those of
a government which, when in opposition to those laws, is not supreme.
Id.
96. Id. at 431. It is worth noting that in McCulloch the Supreme Court was dealing with
a state tax which was imposed on a federal entity; however, the rationale from this case was
soon applied reciprocally. See infra note 98; see also FREELAND Er AL., supra note 83, at 241.
97. See Adymy, supra note 86, at 60.
98. Thus, the doctrine was termed "reciprocal intergovernmental tax immunity." It was
"reciprocal" because it applied to both the tax laws of the federal and state governments on each
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applied to federal taxes on state functions in Collector v. Day." Again,
the Court was concerned with the fact that the federal government and
the states were separate and distinct sovereignties which must coexist."° In Day, the Supreme Court struck down a federal tax on the
salary of a state judicial officer, basing its decision solely on the
rationale of reciprocity."°
In explaining this doctrine, the Supreme Court established the right
of the states and the federal government not to be taxed by each other.
"[Iln both cases the exemption rests upon necessary implication, and is
upheld by the great law of self-preservation; as any government, whose
means employed in conducting its operations, if subject to the control
of another and distinct government, can exist only at the mercy of that
government."' °"n It is within this historical background that we come
to the first income tax laws passed after the enactment of the Sixteenth
Amendment.
The Sixteenth Amendment, ratified in 1913, provided for the taxation
of "all income from whatever source derived."'" Due to the background of Pollock and Day there was some feeling in Congress that the
power to tax under the Sixteenth Amendment did not, and could not,
constitutionally extend to the taxation of interest on state and local
bonds. Letters between two United States senators and Governor Hughes
of New York proposed that the Sixteenth" Amendment should not be
applied to the interest on state bonds." Also, the Congressional
Record states:

other; "intergovernmental" because it dealt with the interaction between the states and the federal

government; and "tax immunity" because that is what the doctrine granted.
99. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870). In Day the Supreme Court made reciprocal their
decision in Dobbins v. Commissionerof Erie County. See id. at 120-21. The Dobbins Court held

that States were prohibited from taxing the salary of an officer of the government of the United
States and based the holding on McCulloch. See Dobbins v. Commissioner of Erie County, 41
U.S. 435, 449-50 (1842), overruledin part by Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
100. See Day, 78 U.S. at 124.
101. See id. at 128.
102. Id. at 127.
103. " he Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any
census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
104. One letter stated, "the power to tax incomes should not be granted in such terms as

to subject to federal taxation the incomes derived from bonds issued by the State.... To place
the borrowing capacity of the State and of its governmental agencies at the mercy of the federal
taxing power would be an impairment of the essential rights of the State .... " 45 CONG. REC.
2245 (1910); see irby, supra note 39, at 680; Martori & Bliss, supra note 57, at 194-95. The
governors of Alabama, Ohio, Virginia and New Jersey, however, all supported the amendment.
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To construe the proposed amendment so as to enable us to
tax the instrumentalities of the State would do violence to
the rules laid down by the Supreme Court for a hundred
years, wrench the whole Constitution from its harmonious
proportions and destroy the object and purpose for which
the whole instrument was framed.105
With this mind-set, Congress passed the first income tax exemption
statute for state interest, less than one year after the passage of the
Sixteenth Amendment." 6
The exemption of state bond interest did not have much of an impact
on the overall amount of tax collected at the time. The tax rates were
graduated, with the maximum individual rate at 6% on income over

$500,000, while the maximum corporate rate was 1%.1° The total

amount of interest paid on state bonds was $147 million. 8 Therefore,
the total tax that could have been collected on state bond interest would
°
have been a maximum of $8.82 million."1

B. Efforts to Abolish the ConstitutionalBases for
the Exemption for State Bonds
Efforts to adopt a constitutional amendment to abolish the state bond
interest exclusion were attempted many times from the 1920s to the
early 1940s."1 ° There were also many bills introduced for the repeal of
45 CONG. REC. 2245 (1910). It is interesting to note that 18 years later Mr. Hughes filed an
amicus curiae brief in support of a tax on state bond interest for certain insurance companies.
See Martori & Bliss, supra note 57, at 194 & n.22 (citing National Life Ins. Co. v. United

States, 277 U.S. 508, 516 (1928)).
A crucial member of Congress supporting the 1913 Act, Representative Hull, also believed
that the Constitution prevented taxing state bond interest. He stated Congress was "not desiring
to raise any constitutional question, or to arouse the antagonism of any of the States...." 50
CONG. REC. 508 (1913); see Derrick, supra note 41, at 14-15; Jerome Kurtz, The Interest
Deduction Under Our Hybrid Tax System: Muddling Toward Accommodation, 50 TAX L. REV.
153, 195, n.139 (1995).
105. 45 CONG. REC. 1698 (1910); see also Adymy, supra note 86, at 62 & n.54.
106. Act of Oct. 3, 1913, ch. 166, 38 Stat. 114, 168; see Adymy, supra note 86, at 62 &
n.56. The exemption was first codified in 1939 at I.R.C. § 22(b)(4).
107. See Pub. L. Section II.A, subdivision I, 6(a), 38 Stat. 166 (1913); see also Derrick,
supra note 41, at 15.
108. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Government Finances in the United States, 1902 to
1957, in 1957 CENSUS OF GOVERNMENTS ADVANCE RELEASE, No. 9, at 21 (1959). See Harvey
E. Brazer, Interest on State and Local Bonds and the Federal Income Tax, House Comm. on
Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 1 TAX REV. COMPENDIUM 721, 721 (1959).
109. $147,000,000 * 6% (top individual rate) = $8,820,000.
110. Attempts for those years were as follows:
1920 (1 attempt): H.R.J. Res. 429, 66th Cong. (1920).
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1921 (5 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 102, 67th Cong. (1921); S.J. Res. 97, 67th Cong. (1921); H.R.L
Res. 211, 67th Cong. (1921); H.RJ. Res. 231, 67th Cong. (1921); H.R.J. Res. 232,67th Cong.
(1921).
1922 (2 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 314, 67th Cong. (1922); S.J. Res. 254, 67th Cong. (1922).
1923 (3 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 1, 68th Cong. (1923); H.RJ. Res. 67, 68th Cong. (1923); H.RJ.
Res. 101, 68th Cong. (1923)
1924 (5 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 136, 68th Cong. (1924); H.R.J. Res. 147, 68th Cong. (1924);
H.R.J. Res. 161, 68th Cong. (1924); H.R.J. Res. 174, 68th Cong. (1924); H.R.J. Res. 193 68th
Cong. (1924).
1925 (3 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 315, 68th Cong. (1925); H.R.J. Res. 48, 69th Cong. (1925);
H.R.J. Res. 88, 69th Cong. (1925).
1927 (2 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 24, 70th Cong. (1927); H.R.J. Res. 43, 70th Cong. (1927).
1928 (1 attempt): H.R.J. Res. 191, 70th Cong. (1928).
1929 (1 attempt): H.R.J. Res. 36, 71st Cong. (1929).
1931 (1 attempt): H.R.J. Res. 112, 72d Cong. (1931).
1932 (5 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 205, 72d Cong. (1932); S.J. Res. 98, 72d Cong. (1932); H.R.J.
Res. 351, 72d Cong. (1932); S.J. Res. 224, 72d Cong. (1932); H.R.J. Res. 506, 72d Cong.
(1932).
1933 (15 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 550, 72d Cong. (1933); S.J. Res. 251, 72d Cong. (1933); H.R.J.
Res. 584, 72d Cong. (1933); H.RJ. Res. 594, 72d Cong. (1933); H.R.J. Res. 55, 73d Cong.
(1933); SJ. Res. 7, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R.J. Res. 68, 73d Cong. (1933); SJ. Res. 25, 73d
Cong. (1933); SJ. Res. 17, 73d Cong. (1933); H.RJ. Res. 146, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R.J. Res.
153, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R.J. Res. 175, 73d Cong. (1933); H.RJ. Res. 184, 73d Cong. (1933);
S.J. Res. 61, 73d Cong. (1933); H.R.J. Res. 197, 73d Cong. (1933).
1934 (15 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 211, 73d Cong. (1934); S.J. Res. 7, 73d Cong. (1934); S.J. Res.
68, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 219, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 221, 73d Cong. (1934);
H.R.J. Res. 222, 73d Cong. (1934); H.RJ. Res. 225, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 239, 73d
Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 240, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 268, 73d Cong. (1934); H.RJ.
Res. 269, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 274, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 284, 73d Cong.
(1934); H.R.J. Res. 292, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R.J. Res. 305, 73d Cong. (1934).
1935 (19 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 49, 74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 52, 74th Cong. (1935);
H.R.J. Res. 53, 74th Cong. (1935); H.RJ. Res. 56, 74th Cong. (1935); H.RJ. Res. 57, 74th
Cong. (1935); SJ. Res. 2, 74th Cong. (1935); S.J. Res. 5, 74th Cong. (1935); S.J. Res. 18,74th
Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 66,74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 98,74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res.
101, 74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 124, 74th Cong. (1935); H.RJ. Res. 126, 74th Cong.
(1935); H.R.J. Res. 128, 74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 194, 74th Cong. (1935); SJ. Res. 150,
74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 334, 74th Cong. (1935); H.R.J. Res. 341, 74th Cong. (1935);
H.R.J. Rcs. 371, 74th Cong. (1935).
1936 (2 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 530, 74th Cong. (1936); H.RJ. Res. 598, 74th Cong. (1936).
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the statutory exclusion for state bond interest."' In 1918, only five
years after the statute providing for the tax exemption for state bonds
was enacted, the House of Representatives approved a bill which taxed
all future issues of state bonds, but the Senate rejected the proposal."1

The first resolution for a constitutional amendment that received serious
attention was introduced in 1922."' The House of Representatives
approved the resolution on January 23, 1923, but it died in the Sen-

1937 (24 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 2,75th Cong. (1937); H.RJ. Res. 29,75th Cong. (1937); H.RJ.
Res. 34, 75th Cong. (1937); H.RJ. Res. 42, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 44, 75th Cong.
(1937); H.R.L Res. 77, 75th Cong. (1937); S.L Res. 5, 75th Cong. (1937); S.J. Res. 25 75th
Cong. (1937); H.R.L Res. 119, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 123, 75th Cong. (1937); H.RJ.
Res. 135, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 192, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 201, 75th Cong.
(1937); H.R.J. Res. 220, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 225, 75th Cong. (1937); H.RJ. Res.
256, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 287, 75th Cong. (1937); S.L Res. 122, 75th Cong. (1937);
S.J. Res. 154, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.L Res. 419, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.J. Res. 441, 75th
Cong. (1937); H.RJ. Res. 512, 75th Cong. (1937); H.R.L Res. 521, 75th Cong. (1937); H.RJ.
Res. 545, 75th Cong. (1937).
1938 (4 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 570, 75th Cong. (1938); S.J. Res. 261, 75th Cong. (1938); H.R.J.
Res. 603, 75th Cong. (1938); H.R.. Res. 648, 75th Cong. (1938).
1939 (9 attempts): H.R.J. Res. 6, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R.J. Res. 39, 76th Cong. (1939); H.RJ.
Res. 49,76th Cong. (1939); S.J. Res. 26,76th Cong. (1939); H.R.J. Res. 60,76th Cong. (1939);
H.R.J. Res. 61, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R.J. Res. 106, 76th Cong. (1939); H.R.J. Res. 143, 76th
Cong. (1939); H.R.L Res. 155, 76th Cong. (1939).
1941 (4 attempts): H.RJ. Res. 19, 77th Cong. (1941); H.R.. Res. 27, 77th Cong. (1941); S.J.
Res. 6, 77th Cong. (1941); H.R.J. Res. 94, 77th Cong. (1941).
1943 (1 attempt): H.R.J. Res. 43, 78th Cong. (1943). See Derrick, supra note 41, at app., tbl.
14. See generally Derrick, supra note 41, at 6-31; Lent, supra note 85, at 304-14; LENT, supra
note 54, at 15-42.
111. See infra pt. II.C.
112. See 40 Stat. 1065, § 213(b) (1919); 56 CONG. REc. 10373, 10409, 10436-40 (1918);
see Derrick, supra note 41, at 17-18; Lent, supra note 85, at 304. The amount of tax-free
securities which existed at the time was $6.5 billion and state bonds were thought to be a serious
threat to the sale of federal securities. Id,
113. See H.R.J. Res. 314, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922). This was the "Green Resolution"
(so-called since it was Representative William R. Green (Iowa) who introduced the resolution)
for a constitutional amendment allowing the reciprocal taxation of federal and state and local
securities. This amendment was passed by the House of Representative by a two-thirds vote. See
Maxwell, supra note 42, at 702; see also Michael H. Neumark, The Taxability of State and
Local Bond Interest by the FederalGovernment,38 CINN. L. REv. 703, n.1 (1969); Lent, supra
note 85, at 305. The move for a constitutional amendment also was coupled with an attempt to
lower the highest marginal tax rates to make tax-exempt bonds less attractive. Lent, supra note
85, at 305.
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ate.114 These attacks on the exemption began at a time when the
federal government was in need of another income source.
Attacks on tax-exempt bonds decreased after the mid-1920s, due to
the lowering of the maximum tax rate from 65% to 20% in 1926.115
The rate did not rise again until the 1930s. 16 In 1933 the Senate
approved a bill to tax all future issues of state bonds, but this was
dropped in the Conference Committee."' Due to the Great Depression,
President Roosevelt asked Congress to repeal the exemption in 1938."'
However, Congress failed to act, in part due to the opposition of state
governments. 9 Roosevelt stated that "[a] fair and effective progressive income tax and a huge perpetual reserve of tax-exempt bonds could
not exist side by side. Those who earn their livelihood from government
114. See 67 CONG. REC. 2284 (1921); LENT, supra note 54, at 24. The Green Resolution
passed the House by a 223 to 101 vote, but the effort for a constitutional amendment was killed
in Senate committee after an attack by the State of Virginia. Lent, supra note 85, at 308.
Discussion of the constitutional amendment can be found at 67 CONG. REc. 2262-83. "The
Green resolution of 1923-1924 thus marked the high tide of the attempts to eliminate tax-exempt
securities by constitutional amendment during the 1920's." LENT, supra note 54, at 24; see also
Hearing on Tax Exempt Securities, H.RJ. Res. 102, 211,231,232, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1922).
The same resolution for a constitutional amendment was offered the next year, but it failed
to even pass the House of Representatives. See H.R.L Res. 136, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1924);
68 CONG. REc. 5420-21, 5857 (1924); Lent, supra note 85, at 308; see also Derrick, supra note
41, at app., tbl. 14.
115. See Derrick, supra note 41, at 22-23; Lent, supra note 85, at 308-09.
116. See Lent, supra note 85, at 309; LENT, supra note 54, at 24. Other attempts were made
at abolishing the tax exemption for state bonds in 1932 (5 resolutions for a constitutional
amendment to tax state bonds), 1933 (a bill to tax state bonds passed Senate, but was dropped
in committee due to its retroactive effects), and 1934 (another resolution for constitutional
amendment, this time adopted by the Senate and rejected by the House). See Lent, supra note
85, at 309.
During this same time period the Supreme Court affirmed the immunity of state bond
interest from taxation in National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S. 508 (1928). The Court
stated that "[i]t is settled doctrine that directly to tax the income from securities amounts to
taxation of the securities themselves, [and] also that the United States may not tax state or
municipal obligations." Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
117. 77 CONG. REc. 5420-21, 5857 (1933); see FrrcH,supra note 41, at 54; LENT, supra
note 54, at 24 n.22; Derrick, supra note 41, at 24.
118. See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 54; see also Taxation of Governmental Securities and
Salaries: HearingsBefore the Special Committee on Taxation of Governmental Securities and
Salaries,76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1939); LENT, supra note 54, at 24; Derrick, supra note 41,
at 26-27; Maxwell, supra note 42, at 702. President Roosevelt also called for a constitutional
amendment to allow for the taxation of state bond interest in 1935, but Congress took no action.
See FITcH, supra note 41, at 54.
119. See Maxwell, supra note 42, at 702; see also Davie & Zimmerman, supra note 52, at
1576; Derrick, supra note 41, at 27-28. From 1927 to 1941 more than 100 resolutions calling
for constitutional amendments to eliminate or modify the state and local tax exemption were
introduced in Congress. See supra note 110. These amounted to 14% of all amendments
introduced. See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 3.
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should bear the same tax burden as those who earn their livelihood in
private employment."'" However, although Congress rejected the
proposal, at about this time the foundation upon which the exemption
in section 103 of the Code is based-reciprocal intergovernmental tax
immunity-started to crumble.'
In 1938, the Supreme Court began to whittle away at the cases upon
which the exemption for state bond interest was founded. In Helvering
v. Gerhardt,"n the Court upheld a federal tax on the income of a state
employee." The Supreme Court stated that for a private person to be
immune from a federal tax it "must clearly appear that the burden upon
the state function is actual and substantial, not conjectural.'
In Graves v. People of State of New York ex rel. O'Keefe," 5 the
implied constitutional immunity of state or federal officers from taxation
by the other government entity was abolished."n In this case, Justice
Frankfurter referred to Justice Marshall's dictum "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy" as just a "seductive cich."'
In 1988 the Supreme Court put to rest any question of the constitutionality of Congress' power to tax the interest on state and local
bonds." In South Carolina v. Baker,1 9 the issue before the Supreme

120. TAXATION OF GOVERNMENT SECURITIES AND SALARIES, MESSAGE FROM THE
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING A RECOMMENDATION FOR LEGISLATION TO

CORRECT INEQUITIES EXISTING INTHE PRESENT TAX LAWS, H.R. Doc. No. 76-113 1 (1939).
121. See LENT, supra note 54, at 25; Derrick, supra note 41, at 27.
122. 304 U.S. 405 (1938), overruled in part by Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 486
(1939).
123. See id at 424. The rationale to allow taxation was provided in Gerhardt in the
following language: "people of the states, acting through their representatives, are laying a tax
on their own institutions and consequently are subject to political restraints which can be
counted on to prevent abuse." Id at 412. Gerhardtdid not overrule Day, but interpreted Day
to restrict the federal taxation of state employees to only those "state judicial officer[s] engaged
in the performance of a function... without which no state 'could long preserve its existence."'
Ia at 415.
124. Id. at 421.
125. 306 U.S. 466 (1939).
126. See id at 487. "The immunity is not one to be implied from the Constitution, because
if allowed it would impose to an inadmissible extent a restriction on the taxing power which the
Constitution has reserved to state governments." Id
127. See id. at 489 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring). Following the Supreme Court's decision,
the Treasury Department urged Congress to include the salaries of state and local employees and
interest on future issues of state and local securities in gross income. Congress only adopted a
portion of the Treasury recommendation which culminated in the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939.
Kirby, supra note 39, at 680-81.
128. South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988). But see Miller & Glick, supra note 16,
at 25, 27, 50-57.
129. 485 U.S. at 505.
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Court was the constitutionality of section 103(j)(1)," 3 which removed
the tax exemption for interest on long-term bonds issued by state and
local governments, unless those bonds were issued in registered
form.' In enacting section 103(j)(1), Congress wanted to require that
bonds be registered in order to help prevent tax evasion.13 ' Bearer

bonds facilitated tax evasion because they left no paper trail, and it was
believed that registration would lessen the amount of tax evasion."'
The Supreme Court, in a seven to one opinion, stated that Pollock had
long since been overruled and that there were no constitutional barriers
to the federal taxation of state and local bond interest."3
130. See id at 507-08. Now this requirement is listed in I.R.C. § 103(b)(3) and I.R.C. §
149; see also Davie & Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 1575.
131. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 507. Registered bonds are recorded on a central list and have
the name of the purchaser on the face of the bond. Any transfer of ownership requires entering
a change on the list and interest is paid to those listed. See BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1283
(6th 3d. 1990); see also ZIPF, supra note 3, at 29. This is in contrast to bearer bonds in which
ownership is assumed by possession and is transferred by physically passing the bond. Id. Bearer
bonds are always coupon bonds in which the bonds have attached coupons which are presented
to the issuer for payment of interest. See id. at 28; see also Davie & Zimmerman, supra note
52, at 1575. The last type of recording system for bonds is "book entry bonds." This is where
the information on the bonds is held by a central depository which takes care of all the books,
records, and payments. See ZIPF,supra note 3, at 31. The book entry system can either hold the
bond certificates for each owner ("certificated book entry") or have no bond certificates at all
("pure book entry"). See id The Depository Trust Company located in the city of New York
handles 95% of all the book entry bonds. See idL at 32. Bonds that are book entry also are
registered bonds by definition. See Id.; see also Miller & Glick, supra note 16, at 47-50.
132. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 508-09. Since Congress has required bonds be registered for
the state interest exclusion to apply, almost no state coupon bonds have been issued. ZIPP, supra
note 3, at 40-41.
133. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 509; see also ZIPF, supra note 3, at 28 (stating the change in
the law was "an attempt to stop the reputed use of tax-exempt bearer bonds for illegal
purposes"). All state bonds are not required to be registered. I.R.C. § 149(a)(2). Those bonds
which do not require registration are (a) bonds of a type not offered to the public, (b) bonds that
mature in one year or less, and (c) bonds which are specified to be sold to only non-U.S.
persons under I.R.C. § 163(f)(2)(B). Id.
134. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 524-25. The Court stated "the owners of state bonds have no
constitutional entitlement not to pay taxes on income they earn from state bonds, and States have
no constitutional entitlement to issue bonds paying lower interest rates than other issuers." Id.
at 525; see ZIPF, supra note 3, at 28-29; Gabinet, supra note 12, at 64-65.
In answer to the question regarding the legislative history of the 16th Amendment-whether
the Amendment in 1913 manifested an intent to freeze the tax immunity for state bonds, Justice
Brennan wrote for the majority, "We disagree. The legislative history merely shows that the
words 'from whatever source derived' of the Sixteenth Amendment was not affirmatively
intended to authorize Congress to tax state bond interest or to have any other effect on which
incomes were subject to federal taxation, and that the sole purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment
was to remove the apportionment requirement for whichever incomes were otherwise taxable."
Baker, 485 U.S. at 522 n.13; see also E. John Steren, The Elimination of the Federal Income
Tax Exemption for Interest Earnedon UnregisteredState and Local Bonds: South Carolina v.
Baker, 42 TAX LAW. 409 (Winter 1989).
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C. Non-Constitutionally-BasedAttempts to
Repeal Section 103
Since the efforts in 1938 to tax the interest from state bonds, there
also have been efforts to repeal the predecessors of
section 1959,141
103 in
1954,'40

1939,13,5

1940, 136

1942,131

1949,11

195 1,139

1969,142 and 1978."43 These efforts all failed, however, primarily due
to the pressure brought to bear on Congress by state and local government officials. While state and local officials rarely are united on any
one issue, they form a powerful influence upon Congress when banded
together on an issue such as the repeal of section 103.'"
I1. WHY SECTION 103 SHOULD BE REPEALED
There are two primary reasons why section 103 should be repealed.
First, the federal subsidy to state governments under section 103 is
inefficient, since the entire federal subsidy does not go to the intended
parties, state governments, but rather benefits private parties. Second,
135. See Lent, supra note 85, at 310-11; Lawrence H. Seltzer, Possibilitiesof Speeding the
Elimination of Tax-Exempt Securities, Nat'l Tax Assoc. Proceedings 189, 189 (1941). In 1939

both the House of Representatives and Senate held committee meetings to discuss the federal
taxation of state bond income. See Seltzer, supra, at 189-90.
136. See FITCH, supra note 41, at 55; LENT, supra note 54, at 25; Derrick, supra note 41,
at 28-29; Seltzer, supra note 135, at 190.
137. This was the first time Congress attempted to eliminate the exemption for state and
local bond interest completely. Before 1942 the repeal of the state bond interest exclusion would
apply to only future, and not outstanding, issues of state bonds. This effort was a very large one
by Congress, but it ultimately failed. See STANLEY SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE
CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDTuRES 210 (1973); FITCH, supra note 41, at 55; LENT, supra note 54,
at 26; Stanley Surrey, Federal Income Tax Reform: The Varied Approaches Necessary to
Replace Tax Expenditures with Direct Government Assistance, 84 HARV. L. REv. 352, 371

(1970).
138. See

LENT, supra note

54, at 26.

139. See id.

140. Maxwell, supra note 42, at 704.
141. Kirby, supra note 39, at 690-91; Maxwell, supra note 42, at 703.
142. In 1969 the House plan included an optional subsidy for state governments which
voluntarily elected to issue taxable bonds. This was left out of the Senate proposals. See WAYS
AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1827; infra text accompanying notes 200-41; see also
Susan Ackerman & David Ott, An Analysis of the Revenue Effects of ProposedSubstitutesfor
Tax Exemption of State and Local Bonds, 23 NAT'L TAX J. 397, 397-98 (1970); Livingston,

supra note 52, at 1173-75; Morris, supra note 38, at 528; Neumark, supra note 113, at 703 n.1;
WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1969, at 2.

143. See S. REP. 95-1263, at 142, 146-47 (1978). For the history of changes to § 103 from
1968 to 1990, see Dennis Zimmerman, Tax-Exempt Bond Legislation, 1968-1990: An Economic
Perspective, 91 TAX NOTES TODAY 53-25 (Mar. 8, 1991). The changes to § 103 since 1972

primarily have focused on limiting the use of state bonds, and not on its repeal.
144. See Morris, supra note 38, at 527.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss1/6

28

Yamamoto: A Proposal for the Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond In
ELIMINATING THE EXCLUSION FOR STATE BOND INTEREST

section 103 lacks equity because it allows higher-bracket taxpayers to
receive more benefit from the tax-exempt bonds than lower-bracket
taxpayers receive, thereby creating a paradox of reverse progressivity of

benefit.
A. Section 103 Is Inefficient
According to the Treasury Department and other writers, the primary
problem with section 103 is that the tax exemption is an inefficient
method of subsidizing state governments."' In 1991, section 103 cost
the federal government an estimated $21 billion in lost revenues, but
only generated $14 billion in interest savings to state governments. ' 4
145. See Ackerman & Ott, supra note 142, at 398; Borris Bittker, Equity, Efficiency, and
Income Tax Theory: Do MisallocationsDrive Out Inequities?, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 735, 73940 (1979) (comparing efficiency and equity theories of tax-exempt bonds); see also WAYS AND
MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826; Joint Committee on Taxation, TAX REFORM
PROPOSALS: TAX TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT BONDS, S. REP. No. 362-15,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 49-50 (1985); S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1978); DAVID
F. BRADFORD, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 76 (1984) (estimating 25-35% of the
federal subsidy is not received by the states); DAVID J. Orr & ALLAN H. MELTZER, FEDERAL
TAX TREATMENT OF STATE AND LOCAL SECURITIES 3, 14-17 (1963); Gabinet, supra note 12,
at 66; Hole, supra note 24, at 960-64; Calvin Johnson, Inefficiency Does Not Drive Out Inequity:
Market Equilibrium and Tax Shelters, 71 TAX NOTES 377, 382 (Apr. 15, 1996); Kirby, supra
note 39, at 686; Maxwell, supra note 42, at 706; Joel Michael, Reciprocal Intergovernmental
Taxation of Federal, State, and Local Bonds, 48 TAX NOTES 1671, 1672 (Sept. 24, 1990);
Morris, supra note 38, at 527; Dick Netzer, The Effect of Tax Simplification on State and Local
Governments 244, in ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAX SIMPLIFICATION SPONSORED BY
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF BOSTON (1985); Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Income Taxation of
State and Local Government Obligations,TAX POL'Y 3, 8-9 (May-June 1969); Surrey, supra
note 137, at 372-73; Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 285, 288. Bond financing rose from $11.1
billion in 1965 to a maximum of $204.3 billion in 1985, before returning to $98.7 billion in
1987. Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 284; see also Calvin H. Johnson, Is an Interest Deduction
Inevitable?, 6 VA. TAX REV. 123, 162-70 (1986). But see Weiss, supra note 4, at 1954 (stating
that an "efficient tax system" is one which does not interfere with a taxpayer's behavior). See
generally Edward A. Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes: The Rehabilitation of Tax
Incentives, 64 TEX. L. REV. 973,980-1012, 1035 (1986) (examining tax incentives under various
notions of efficiency).
146. See Michael, supra note 145, at 1673; see also MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H.
SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 229 (1995) (estimating that
state governments only receive approximately 66% of the revenue lost to the federal
government). Cf. Executive Office of the President, Budget of the United States Government
Fiscal Year 1991, A-76 (1990). In 1971, the Treasury estimated the revenue loss to the federal
government at $3.3 billion, while only allowing for a $2.5 billion interest savings to state and
local governments. See Hearings on H.R. 9688 Before the Subcomm. on Housing of the
Committee on Banking and Currency, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 852 (1971); see also Morris, supra
note 38, at 527.
In 1993 there was $46.4 billion in tax-exempt interest claimed on individual tax returns, an
increase of 1.6% over 1992. The number of returns which reported tax-exempt income was
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The difference between lost revenue to the federal government on the
one hand, and the benefits to state governments on the other, is due to
the supply of and demand for tax-exempt bonds. 47 Returning to the
example in Part I.A.,'" recall that the taxpayer with a marginal tax

rate of 40% had the same amount of after-tax income from a $1000
taxable bond with a yield of $100 (i.e., an annual interest rate of 10%)
and a tax-exempt bond with a yield of $60 (i.e., an annual interest rate

of 6%)."49 However, if the taxpayer's marginal tax rate was 36%, in

order for the after-tax return to be the same whether the taxpayer
purchased a taxable or tax-exempt bond, the tax-exempt bond must have
a yield of $64 (i.e., an interest rate of 6.4%). If the taxpayer's marginal
tax rate was 31%, the required yield to make a tax-exempt bond an
attractive purchase would increase to $69 (i.e., an interest rate of
6.9%)."5 Table 1 shows the yields that must be provided to a taxpayer
at the different marginal rates of section 1 of the Internal Revenue Code
for our example.'
Table 1
Marginal Tax

Rate

Tax

After-Tax Return

Equivalent

Tax-Exempt
Rate

39.6%

$39.60

$60.40

6.04%

36%
31%
28%

$36
$31
$28

$64
$69
$72

6.4%
6.9%
7.2%

15%

$15

$85

8.5%

approximately 4.7 million, which was a 5.3% increase from 1992. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
STATISTICS OF INCOME-1993 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 2 (1996) [hereinafter
STATISTICS].
147. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, 1 15.2.1.

148. See supra text accompanying note 34.
149. A direct comparison between taxable and tax-exempt bonds has been questioned and
one author suggests that a complete analysis must view other tax-exempt opportunities which
investors may purchase. See George Cooper, The Taming of the Shrewd: Identifying and
ControllingIncome Tax Avoidance, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 657, 699-700 (1985).
150. Actual bond pricing does reflect the changes in the marginal rates. See James M.
Poterba, Tax Reform and the Market for Tax-Exempt Debt, 19 REGIONAL SCI. & UR. ECON.
537, 561 (1989). The difference of interest "between long-term taxable and tax-exempt bonds
responds to changes in expected individual tax rates ....

"

Id.

151. Of course this assumes that the purchaser is under no legal constraint to purchase the
state and local bonds and is risk neutral. Many insurance companies and trust funds are required
to purchase tax-exempt bonds due to their competitive low risk compared to corporate bonds.
Under § 1 the tax rates are progressive, which means the rate of tax increases as the amount
of taxable income increases. See Hole, supra note 24, at 961 n.38.
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As Table 1 shows, the lower a particular taxpayer's marginal rate is,
the higher the state bond interest rate (and therefore the greater the
payout by the state government) must be for the state bonds to be
equally as attractive as higher-interest taxable bonds." There would
be no problem if there were enough taxpayers in the highest tax bracket
to purchase all the available tax-exempt bonds, but there are not." In
1993, fewer than five out of every 1000 tax returns filed resulted in
taxation at the highest marginal rate of 39.6%." This means that for
state governments to be able to sell bonds, the bonds must carry a high
enough interest rate to attract some lower-bracket taxpayers.' 5 When
152. One author presents a scenario in which taxpayers at various marginal rates purchase
a $1000 bond with a 4% annual yield.
A taxpayer in the top (90 percent) bracket who buys a taxable bond yielding $40
annually, could only keep $4. The exemption is worth thirty-six fortieths of the
yield. He would be as well off to purchase at par a tax exempt [bond] yielding 0.4
percent as a taxable one yielding 4 percent. A taxpayer in the 80-percent bracket
would keep $8 out of $40, and to him the exemption is worth thirty-two fortieths
of the yield. An equivalent exempt to him must yield 0.8 percent. A taxpayer in
the 60 percent bracket would keep $16, and to him the exemption is worth twentyfour fortieths of the yield. An equivalent exempt must yield him 2.4 percent. A
taxpayer in the lowest (20 percent) bracket would keep $32 out of $40, and to him
exemption is worth eight-fortieths of the yield. An exempt yield of 3.2 percent is
equivalent to 4 percent from a taxable bond.
Maxwell, supra note 42, at 707.
153. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 144 (1978). "Because there are relatively few
persons in the highest marginal tax bracket, the'increasing volume of tax-exempt issues makes
it necessary for state and local governments to increase the yield on tax-exempt issues. . . in
order to attract enough investors." Id.; see also Surrey, supra note 145, at 5.
Individuals with an adjusted gross income (AGI) of less than $50,000 accounted for 25.6%
of all tax-exempt interest earnings for 1991, while those with an AGI of greater than $50,000
accounted for 74.4% of all interest earned. However, 7.1% of investors with AGI between
$50,000 and $74,999, 12.4% of those in the $75,000-$99,999, and 21% of those with AGIs
between $100,000-$199,999 invested in tax-exempt bonds. This compares with 37.6%, 52.7%
and 63.9% of individuals in those same brackets who reported dividend income in 1991. Public
Securities Association, Taxpayer Holdings of Municipal Bonds Increased, Says PSA, 93 TAx
NOTES TODAY 186-61 (Sept. 8, 1993).
154. STATISTICS, supra note 146, at 102. The total number of individual returns filed which
were taxed at the highest marginal rate was 453,112. See id.
155. See supra note 7 for the average percentage differential in state and taxable bonds for
the last five years. See generally BUREAU OF CENSUS, supra note 7, at 522, No. 804 (giving
statistics for historic yields of taxable and tax-exempt bonds). In 1969, the interest rate for taxexempt bonds reached 75% of the interest given on comparable taxable bonds, from its historical
ratio of around 60%. See WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826. It has been
suggested that interest rates on state bonds are more volatile since there is less demand for the
bonds due to their lower interest rates. The normal incentive to purchase tax-exempt bonds is
not present for investors which are not subject to federal income tax (foreigners, pension funds,
other exempt organizations) or in the lower tax brackets. See Galper & Petersen, supra note 33,
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this interest increase occurs, all buyers will receive the same yield,
because the market is undifferentiated and state governments cannot

specify different interest rates for purchasers with different marginal tax
rates."5 Therefore, the higher-bracket taxpayers will receive a greater
net tax savings, or "extra" interest payments."

What does all this mean in relation to the subsidy function of section
103? The extra interest that the highest bracket taxpayer receives does
not subsidize state governments; it goes to the higher-bracket taxpayers. 5 ' Therefore, federal tax revenue forfeited does not equal the
benefit received by state governments in the form of lower interest rates
on state bonds.'59 In sum, the extra interest amounts benefiting the
at 208; Michael, supra note 145, at 1673; see also SURREY, supranote 137, at 214. Surrey states
the "dependence on commercial banks produces great swings in buying demand, since in times
of full employment and monetary tightness the commercial banks turn off as buyers and instead
lend all available funds to business customers." Id.
For more on the market forces which shape the bond market, see Galper & Petersen, supra
note 33, at 208-11; Kryzanowski, supra note 7, at 583-84.
156. Surrey states:
[A]s the need of those [state] governments for capital funds inevitably becomes
ever greater, the method of assistance, i.e., whatever lowering of interest rates the
exemption could achieve, is inevitably painting those governments into a corner.
They are forced to sell more and more bonds to buyers who really are not the
obvious buyers of those bonds but who are only tempted to do so because of the
exemption. High-bracket individuals should normally be buying equities, and banks
should be making business loans. To tempt them away from those natural pursuits
into buying more and more tax-exempt bonds, and to draw individuals in lowerbrackets and other financial institutions in the same direction, will require higher
interest rates on the bonds to make the exemption worth more. The interest savings
to the state and local governments will thereby decrease, while tax inequity
increases as the higher-bracket individuals and banks obtain the benefit of interest
rates higher than is needed to tempt them into the exempt market. At the same
time, natural buyers of bonds, such as private pension trusts, state and local
retirement funds, and educational and charitable institutions, are not attracted by
the tax exemption, since their income is already exempted.
SURREY, supra note 137, at 211.
157. See Maxwell, supra note 42, at 707; see also FITCH, supra note 41, at 48.
158. There are two additional reasons why state bonds are inefficient. The first is since they
cause "activities to be undertaken that are not sufficiently profitable to compete successfully for
capital in the absence of a governmental subsidy." BnTI'KER & LOKKEN, supra note 32, at 15-15.
This primarily would apply to private projects funded by private activity bonds, and not true
public goods. The second is that state bonds take away investment capital which is required for
the expansion of business. This occurs because the rich, who can afford to take risks, are putting
money into state bonds instead of venture capital. See SURREY, supra note 137, at 211.
159. The way in which the § 103 subsidy operates leads to the very odd result that when
the interest rate differential between taxable and tax-exempt bonds is small, the loss to the
federal government is the greatest. What makes the situation worse is that the high interest
situations are where the subsidy to state governments is the smallest. See Maxwell, supra note
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higli~r-bracket taxpayers cost the federal government in terms of lost tax
revenue, but that cost is not fully received by the state governments. 1"
Therefore, if the interest rate on a $10,000 bond is set by a state
government in order to be attractive for a taxpayer in the 28% bracket,
the interest rate as read from Table 1 must be 7.2% in order to result in
an after-tax yield equal to that of a 10% taxable bond.161 If a 40%
bracket taxpayer purchases these bonds, the federal government loses
$400 in foregone tax revenue,' but the issuing state government only
receives a $280 benefit from the difference in the interest rates between
its bonds and the 10% taxable bonds." 3 Section 103 is the only federal
subsidy that allows for about 65-75% of its benefits to be received by
the intended beneficiary, while the remainder benefits wealthy individuals, banks and other corporations."6
42, at 707; see also Bittker, supra note 145, at 739-40 (stating that § 103 might be inefficient
since it favors the flow of funds toward investment in projects with a lower economic output).
160. See Peter Fortune, The Municipal Bond Market: The Need for Reform, 4 TAX NOTES
3, 4-5 (Mar. 29, 1976). "The amount of the windfall is the difference between the interest yield
that would be sufficient to stimulate the purchase of a tax-exempt issue by a high bracket
taxpayer and the higher current market interest yield that is necessary to bring the additional
investors from lower tax rate brackets in the tax-exempt bond market." S. REP. NO. 1263, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1978).
161. This again assumes that the risks are equal between taxable and tax-exempt bonds,
which they are noL
162. If the taxpayer purchased a $10,000, 10% taxable bond, the bond would have a yield
of $1000. After applying the taxpayer's marginal rate of 40%, there is a $400 tax liability.
163. This is due to the 2.8% interest differential between the tax-exempt bond (sold at
7.2%) and the taxable bond (sold at 10%) in this example. Tax-exempt bonds have historically
provided 60% to 75% of the yield of taxable bonds. See GRAEMZ & SCHENK, supra note 146,
at 229; Michael, supra note 145, at 1680 n.9.
164. See Morris, supra note 38, at 527; see also SURREY, supra note 137, at 211;
BRADFORD, supra note 145, at 76; Michael, supra note 145, at 1672 n.9. For other examples and
explanations of the inefficiency argument, see Ackerman & Ott, supranote 142, at 398; Michael
J. Graetz, Assessing the DistributionalEffects of Income Tax Revision: Some Lessons from
Incidence Analysis, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 351, 359-62 (1974); Maxwell, supra note 42, at 707.
The 1986 Act compression of the tax brackets made a smaller differential between the
various tax brackets, and therefore decreased the inefficiency. However, the increase in the
highest marginal tax bracket to 39.6% in the 1993 by Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13201(a) increased
the inefficiency inherent in § 103. See Michael, supra note 145, at 1672 n.9; Zimmerman, supra
note 52, at 290. Any increase in the marginal tax rate will increase tax-exempt bond purchases.
See Daniel Feenberg & Martin Feldstein, National Bureau of Economic Research Reports, NBER
Paper on Effects of 1993 Tax Rate Increase, 95 TAX NOTES TODAY 224-50 (Nov. 16, 1995);
Poterba, supra note 150, at 540. See generally Daniel Feenberg & James M. Poterba, Who Owns
Municipal Bonds?, Conference on the Economics of Tax-Exempt Bond Markets: April 5-6,
1991, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Apr. 19, 1991, available in LEXIS 91 TNT 86-29
(discussing tax-exempt asset holdings across tax brackets).
Of the $4.2 billion estimated subsidy in 1977 only about 70%, or $3 billion, aided state
governments. See Stanley Surrey, Three Arguments for the Taxable Bond Option: Equity,
Efficiency, and Marketability, 4 TAX NOTES 9, 10 (Mar. 29, 1976).
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The cost of the section 103 subsidy in lost tax revenues to the federal
government was estimated at $21 billion in 1991, and generated only

$14 billion in interest savings to state governments, 16 up from the

approximately $11.5 to $18.1 billion in lost revenue in 1988." This
is far greater than it was in 1959 when the revenue loss was estimated
at $600 million. 67 In 1969, the estimated loss rose to $1.8 billion, with
state governments' annual interest savings totaling $1.3 billion." This
increasing amount of lost revenue to the federal government does not
provide a full subsidy to state governments, and should not be permitted.
B. Tax-Exempt State Bonds Lack Equity
In general, the inequity argument is derived from the proposition that

a progressive income tax should not allow for inefficiencies that erode
the tax base and reduce progressivity in favor of the wealthy." This
lack of equity is present both horizontally (between taxpayers in the
same marginal brackets), and vertically (between taxpayers in different

marginal brackets)." °

Section 103 lacks horizontal equity.17' Horizontal equity is present

when the taxation on income is applied equally to those with equal

165. Michael, supra note 145, at 1673.
166. See Feenberg & Poterba, supra note 164, at 12. The authors state that 27.8 cents could
be made from every dollar denied the state bond interest exclusion from tax. See id. at 4; see
also Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 288. This loss to the federal government must be weighed
against the loss in bond sales to the states if the interest rate was not raised.
167. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 687.
168. WAYS AND MEANs REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826. Reports from before 1986 show
that for each dollar of interest saved by state governments, it costs the federal treasury $1.25 to
$1.30. See Michael, supra note 145, at 1672. While this amount has decreased somewhat after
the 1986 tax act, the inefficiency is still present today. See id. at 1672 n.9.
169. See Gabinet, supra note 12, at 64, 67; see also BRADFORD, supra note 145, at 76-77;
SURREY, supra note 137; Fortune, supra note 160, at 3; Michael, supra note 145, at 1673;
Surrey, supra note 164, at 11-12. Surrey states that the inequity caused by § 103 is "distinctly
unfair and morally wrong." Id. at 12. But see Davie & Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 1578
(stating that efficiency issues should be less of a concern after additional Federal Regulation of
the use of state bonds).
170. "A postulate of any system of taxation is that the burden of paying the tax should be
borne equally or that the burden should at least be levied in a consistent and rational fashion."
Leo P. Martinez, Of Fairnessand Might: The Limits of Sovereign Power to Tax After Winstar,

28 ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1193, 1200 (1996).
171. However, it is admitted the lack of horizontal equity is present for all tax preference
items. See generally Daniel N. Shaviro, Selective Limitations on Tax Benefits, 56 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1189 (1989); Lawrence Zelenak, When Good PreferencesGo Bad: A CriticalAnalysis of
the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisionsof the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEX. L. REv. 499, 588-89

(1989); Zelinsky, supra note 145.
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incomes."7 Due to the exclusion of state bond interest from a
taxpayer's income, section 103 does not achieve horizontal equity."r
Two taxpayers, each of whom makes $100,000 from bond investments,
will not be taxed the same if one invests in taxable bonds and the other
in tax-exempt state bonds." If both taxpayers are in the 40% marginal
bracket, the taxpayer who invested in taxable bonds will have $60,000
after tax is paid on the income, while the taxpayer who invested in state
bonds will retain the entire $100,000 tax-free.'75
Section 103 also lacks vertical equity. Vertical equity is present when
persons in unequal situations are differentiated in an appropriate
manner.76 Section 103 does not create this situation; rather, it grants
relief from tax in a manner inverse to the taxpayer's ability to pay."
Those investors who are at the highest marginal tax rate will receive the
greatest amount of benefit in the form of relief from taxation on bond
172. "Taxation according to ability to pay requires, among other things, that similar burdens
be imposed on taxpayers in similar positions-horizontal equity." Weiss, supra note 4, at 1955;
see 01 & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 9 (horizontal equity means that the "income tax should
apply equally to equal incomes."); Martinez, supra note 170, at 1200.
173. See Bittker, supra note 145, at 742; see also Or & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 911. But see Weiss, supra note 4, at 1955-58.
174. "One of the basic tax principles is that 'equal incomes should bear equal tax
liabilities.' Taxpayers in similar circumstances should bear similar burdens. Yet, the exemption
for State and local bond interest is a shocking violation of this principle." Kirby, supra note 39,
at 684. This lack of horizontal equity also is present when some private businesses are allowed
to obtain tax-exempt financing for some of their activities. For those businesses with access to
tax-exempt financing, this creates an advantage over others in the same or closely-related lines
of businesses in the same marketing area, because they have access to capital at a lower interest
rate. See Stutzer, supra note 2, at 3. The use of state bonds to bring in businesses to the state
"may wholly or largely negate the employment and tax base growth provided by the firms
subsidized... ." or "statewide employment and tax base growth [may be] actually lowered by
the subsidized entry of competitors." lId
175. In spite of this mathematical outcome, some commentators find horizontal equity. See
Weiss, supra note 4, at 1955-58. Weiss argues that § 103 is horizontally equitable when looking
at both the amount of capital invested and after-tax return. See id.at 1956. Weiss states that
horizontal equity is achieved since "the market return on the two types of bonds [taxable and
non-taxable] will reflect the tax preference granted to exempt bonds." Id, However Ott &
Meltzer responded to this argument over 30 years before Weiss wrote her article by stating "[i]t
might be argued that.., no equity issue exists, since by accepting a lower yield on tax-exempt
securities, investors give up income equivalent to the income tax obligation that would arise if
they invested in fully taxable securities. This is true only of the marginal investor for whom the
yield differential between exempts and taxables is equal to the marginal tax rate." Orr &
MELIZER, supra note 145, at 9.
176. See OTT & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 9; Martinez, supra note 170, at 1200; Weiss,
supra note 4, at 1958 ("[vlertical equity requires that more affluent taxpayers pay proportionately
more in taxes").
177. See Orr & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 10; Kirby, supra note 39, at 684; Weiss,
supra note 4, at 1958-62.
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interest.'
As shown in Part llI.A., those taxpayers in the highest
marginal tax bracket often receive a windfall of profit on their investment over the return that would be required for them to purchase
bonds.179 As previously noted, the economic incentive to purchase the
bonds is greatest for those with the highest marginal rates." While the
supply and demand of tax-exempt bonds historically has created bonds
with lower than optimal interest rates, in terms of efficiency the
difference between the rates have seldom been low enough to attract the
lowest bracket taxpayers.'
The horizontal and vertical inequity of section 103 causes a danger
to taxpayer morale." As the Treasury Report on Tax Simplification
and Reform (Treasury One) stated:
The United States has long been proud of the "taxpayer
morale" of its citizens-the willingness to pay voluntarily
the income taxes necessary to finance government activities.
Taxpayer morale ultimately depends, however, on the belief
that taxes are fair. If the basis for this belief comes under
suspicion, voluntary compliance with the tax laws is
jeopardized. Thus, the perceived lack of fairness of the
income tax may be as important as actual complexities,
economic distortions, and inequities. Taxpayers resent
paying substantially more tax than their neighbors who have
equal or higher incomes. This is true even if the neighbor
reduces taxes through commonly available and perfectly
rather than by questionable or illegal
legal exclusions..,
1 83
means.

As stated by the Treasury, taxpayer morale is important since the United
States "is primarily a self-assessment system. If taxpayers are generally
to pay their taxes on a voluntary basis, they must feel that these taxes
178. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
179. See supra text accompanying notes 158-64; Weiss, supra note 4, at 1960.
180. See supra text accompanying note 164.
181. The interest rates for state bonds reached their peak from 1980 to 1982, when they had
interest rates between 9 and 13%. See ZIPF, supra note 3, at 50. This would not be high enough
to be attractive to the lower bracket taxpayers, however, many, if not most, of those taxpayers
in the lowest brackets would lack the discretionary income to purchase investment assets in any
case.
182. "Similarly situated taxpayers can pay considerably different amounts of tax... and

high-income families may pay tax on a smaller portion of their income than do poorer families.
The result is a perception that the income tax itself is unfair, both within and across income
classes." TREASURY DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS,
SiMPaCrY, AND ECONOMIC GROwTH 16-17 (1984).
183. Id. at 9; see Suellen M. Wolfe, Recovery from Halper: The Painfrom Additions to Tax
Is Not the Sting of Punishment, 25 HOFSTRA L. REv. 161, 183 (1996).
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are fair."'' The sense of fairness is based on taxpayers' feeling that
' Any feelings of
the tax burden is shared on an equitable basis. 85
taxpayers that the tax system is unfair, or favors the rich, is likely to
harm8 6morale and lead to a decline in voluntary compliance with the
law.'
IV. THE NEED FOR A SUBSIDY

Because section 103 is neither efficient nor equitable in the way it
channels the federal subsidy to state governments, change is necessary.
Making matters worse, section 103 is being used by state governments
for projects primarily assisting private individuals or businesses. One of
the most egregious examples is the funding of sports stadiums, which
themselves are inefficient at creating jobs and economic benefit for the
community.' As discussed in this Part, while no constitutional barrier
to the repeal of section 103 exists,' 8 and even though there have been
abuses, such as the use of bond proceeds primarily for private purposes,
the subsidy provided for certain other state government projects should
be retained. While problems exist in section 103, there also exist
fundamental reasons for retaining some type of federal subsidy for state
governments to support their public construction efforts.
The first fundamental reason to retain the federal subsidy for some
projects is that without the federal subsidy many necessary state
government projects would be eliminated due to lack of available
funding, or they would be funded with state taxes, which are often
regressive. State bonds are used for items of social capital like schools,

184. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM Acr OF 1969, 91sT CONG., 2D SESS. 1-2 (Comm. Print
1970).
185. See id.
186. "[Ilnequity of the tax system undermine[s] taxpayer morale-a valuable, yet fragile,
national asset and a prerequisite for a tax system based on voluntary compliance." TREASURY
DEPARTMENT, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLIcrrY, AND

ECONOMIC GROwTH 2 (1984); see Martinez, supra note 170, at 1200 ("A primary reason for
enacting fair tax legislation is that it promotes in the taxpayer a perception that obedience of the
tax laws, as well as punishment for violation of the tax laws, is morally grounded. This
perception facilitates tax collection."); Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals, and Legitimacy, 1994
B.Y.U. L. REV. 521, 550. See generally Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why
They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 161-71
(1996).
187. See Lathrope, supra note 2, at 1153-55; Mitten & Burton, supra note 2, at 144-46. See
generally Stutzer, supra note 2, at 3, 7; Zimmerman, supra note 2.
188. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 505; see supra text accompanying notes 128-33. But see Miller
& Glick, supra note 16, at 47-50.
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roads, sanitation facilities, police and fire protection, and jails.189 If
section 103 were eliminated completely without any replacement by the
federal government, there could be several possible consequences."
First, many needed public projects by state governments might no longer
be affordable because the state governments would have to pay higher
interest rates for bond funding, and there could be a large public outcry
for federal assistance for these projects.19 ' Second, state governments
could maintain the same levels of services but fund those services with
tax revenues. Since many state and. local taxes are regressive,"9 it is
not unreasonable to believe that the new taxes to support building
projects and services would follow this same trend.'93
The second fundamental reason for a federal subsidy is that state
governments provide "public goods," which economic theory suggests

189. See Brazer, supra note 108, at 726; Zimmerman, supra note 61, at 510. Zimmerman
suggests that one of the reasons for the increase in tax-exempt bond financing of private
activities is that state government officials view the bonds as "costless to their taxpayers" and
themselves. This is because the bonds utilized for private activity financing are revenue bonds,
which are to be paid out of the revenue stream created by the project, or revenue collected from
other projects. This is in contrast to general obligation bonds which are paid from the tax
revenues of the state governments as payment for the bond and its interest. He suggests the only
change which is required to reform state bonds is forcing state governments to guarantee
payment from state revenue streams. Id. at 510, 512-13.
190. One author gives five ways in which state governments could react: (1) increase taxes,
(2) decrease expenditures other than debt service out of taxation, (3) decrease new borrowing
to reduce the outlay for debt service, (4) decrease the rate of debt retirement, and (5) decrease
the case surpluses, or reserves, which would otherwise be built-up. See FiTCH, supra note 41,
at 59; see also Clayton P. Gillette, Fiscal Federalismand the Use of MunicipalBond Proceeds,
58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1030 (1983). Professor Gillette's article suggests that § 103 should be limited
to subsidize only those projects which benefit those persons living outside of the area of the
local government sponsoring the project (i.e., the benefit "spills over" to other localities). This
way the Federal government would be helping to only subsidize those projects which were
public goods.
191. See Harry L. Severson, An Evaluationof the Effect of the Removal of Tax Exemption
on State and Local Bonds, I TAX REV. COMPENDIUM 773, 779 (1959).
192. A regressive tax is one that is levied at rates which increase less rapidly than the
increase of the tax base. This causes the poorer taxpayers to bear more of the tax burden. A
classic example of a regressive tax is sales tax, which does not change for the amount of income
of the purchaser. A regressive tax is also one that decreases as the tax base increases. See
RUTHERFORD, supra note 9, at 388-89. .
193. See Brazer, supra note 108, at 726. But see Kirby, supra note 39, at 689. Kirby stated
there would not be much change in state taxes if § 103 was eliminated. His assertion was based
on the fact many state bonds are revenue bonds which are'paid off by the revenue derived from
the projects funded (e.g., tollways, parking facilities, public utilities). The thought was that the
higher interest rate payments would not burden the state taxpayer, but fall squarely on those
consumers who use the projects which the bonds financed. At the time Kirby's article was
written, 30% of new issues were revenue bonds. See id.
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will be underprovided if there were no federal subsidy. 9 A public
good is defined as follows: (1) It is a benefit that should be available for
the consumption of everyone, not only those who can afford to pay; and
(2) It is a good or benefit that can be used by one person without
interfering with another person's consumption of that same good.' 95
Examples of classic public goods are national defense and clean air."
Neither national defense nor clean air can be limited to those persons
who pay for the benefit; all those within the area protected or enjoying
clean air will benefit. Also, one person taking advantage of either will
not prohibit another individual's consumption of the same benefit.
These elements can be found in many state projects such as public
buildings, bridges, schools, sidewalks, and sewers. Because the benefit
cannot be restricted to only those who contribute, nor can it be
practically charged on a per use basis, under economic theory these
goods will not be supplied by the private sector and must be provided
by the public sector."9 However, while these goods are provided by
the public sector, the benefit of many state projects is not restricted by
political borders; there is little incentive, then, for individual local
governments to start or complete these projects.'98 This means that for
a state government to undertake a project that will benefit those
individuals or businesses outside its political boundaries, the project
must be subsidized. The provision of public goods is one reason why
the federal government should subsidize these projects, so the benefit
can be provided at the appropriate level, despite the disincentive that can
arise from supplying a public good.' 99
V. PROPOSALS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF SECTION 103
One of the most serious attempts for the complete repeal of the tax
exemption for state bond interest occurred in 1942. ' Since that time
the efforts at establishing greater efficiency and equity have centered on
194. See AMDURSKY & GILLETTE, supra note 44, at 3-4; Vehom & Nannenhom, supra note
70, at 1112.
195. See RUTHERFORD, supra note 9, at 375; see also Davie & Zimmerman, supra note 52,
at 1577; Mark A. Hall & John D. Colombo, The Donative Theory of the Charitable Tax
Exemption, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1379, 1390 (1991).
196. Examples of public goods on the state and local level are streets, police and fire
protection, and sewers.
197. See Hall & Colombo, supra note 195, at 1390.
198. See Vehom & Nannenhom, supra note 70, at 1112.
199. See id.
200. Lent, supra note 85, at 312-13; Surrey, supra note 137, at 371. The bill for the

elimination of the exclusion of state bond interest from gross income passed the Senate Finance
Committee, but was killed by amendment on the Senate floor. The proposition never made it
out of committee in the House. See Lent, supra note 85, at 312.
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a substitute subsidy for the state governments as opposed to its complete
repeal. These efforts focus on finding a replacement for the loss of lowinterest bond funds revenue presently available to state governments
under section 103.2"1 However, all of these attempts by Congress and
the Treasury have been defeated by the intense lobbying of state governments and bond dealers.'
For state governments, there are two primary attractive features of
section 103. First, section 103 amounts to a subsidy from the federal
government, but the federal government exercises only limited control
over the types of projects that will qualify for the subsidy.' Second,
there is no federal ceiling on many state bonds regarding the amount
that the state governments may receive through the subsidy. The only
limit on the state governments is the volume cap based on the amount
of non-qualified bonds sold, and very often projects subject to the cap
are not true public projects producing public goods.'
The plans suggested through the years to exchange the exclusion of
state bond interest exemption with a replacement subsidy have attempted
to retain both of these advantages of section 103. The vast majority of
methods suggested for the replacement of section 103 fall into one of
two categories. First are the plans that would tax the entire amount of
the interest on state bonds, but which would require the federal
government to refund all or a portion of the tax collected back to the
issuing state government. Second are the plans that utilize a tax credit
to induce purchasers for the bonds by allowing for a reduction of a

taxpayer's tax liability.' 5 Of all the alternative subsidy proposals made

201. See supra notes 134-43 and accompanying text.
202. See Michael, supra note 145, at 1671-72; Morris, supra note 38, at 528.
203. MCDANIEL Er AL., supra note 83, at 344; Surrey, supra note 137, at 373; WAYS AND
MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826; see also Davie & Zimmerman, supra note 52, at 1578;
Thompson Statement, supra note 5, at 2; Zimmerman, supra note 61, 510-11. One author states
"[the exemption is, in effect, an open-ended federal subsidy of borrowing costs, provided
indirectly through reduced federal income taxes of the bondholder/investors." Michael, supra
note 145, at 1672. State governments enjoy this use of borrowing for capital expenditures since
they receive funds quickly, while not putting a present strain on their budgets. Galper &
Petersen, supra note 33, at 206. The prohibitions on arbitrage bonds and putting a volume cap
on certain types of state bonds are the beginnings of federal control in this area. Michael, supra
note 145, at 1673.
204. See McDANmL Er AL., supra note 83, at 344; Surrey, supra note 137, at 373; WAYS
AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826. However, the more bonds which the state
governments sell, the greater the overall supply on the market. If demand for the bonds is
constant this means that to be able to sell the bonds they must raise the interest rates given on
the bonds, which makes the subsidy less, while at the same time increasing the bonds'
inefficiency. See supra text accompanying notes 144-56.
205. The methods for getting a subsidy to the state governments while keeping the primary
advantages are as follows:
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in Congress, the ones most frequently discussed in the literature are the
direct federal interest subsidy, originally proposed by Laurence Seltzer,
and a taxpayer credit plan proposed by Lyle Fitch.
A. DirectFederalInterest Subsidy Plan: Tax
All Interest on State Bonds, but Remit a
PortionBack to the State Governments
1. History and Discussion of the Seltzer Refund Plan
Including in gross income interest received from state bonds and
remitting a portion of the tax collected back to the issuing state
(1) Use a Federal government intermediary to help finance state governments. See
Morris, supra note 38, at 527-28. This might take on the form of a National Urban
Development Bank (Urbank) which would issue taxable Federal bonds and then lend
the proceeds to state governments at a federally subsidized interest rate. See Gabinet,
supra note 12, at 86 (citing S. 409, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)). This plan has not
received any wide acceptance due to operating and administrative difficulties inherent
in such a system. A proposal for a bank of this sort was made by President Johnson in
1969, and legislation was introduced for the bank's establishment in the same year. See
id. at 86 n.68; see also SURREY, supra note 137, at 215-16; Fortune, supra note 160,
at 6; Hole, supra note 24, at 962 n.46; Surrey, supra note 137, at 377-78. For an
economic analysis of this plan, see Galper & Petersen, supra note 33, at 212, 217-21.
The article concludes the Urbank plan is an inferior method of subsidizing state
governments. See id. at 231. The federal government's control of the bank and projects
which it would subsidize also made the plan unacceptable to state governments. See
SURREY, supra note 137, at 216.
(2) Give an interest subsidy to pension funds on their holdings of tax-exempt bonds.
This plan hoped to increase demand for state bonds by creating incentives for large
retirement funds to trade in the tax-exempt market. A direct subsidy to investors,
instead of the states, would result. Galper & Petersen, supra note 33, at 212, 214-15;
Morris, supra note 38, at 528. This plan never gained wide acceptance in Congress or
academia.
(3) Guarantee all state bonds by the tax receipts from the state taxpayers, but the
issuing state government would be free of all restrictions on for what, and by whom,
the proceeds could be used. See Zimmerman, supra note 61, at 512. The plan attempts
to make local legislators feel that tax-exempt bonds are not "cost free" to the taxpayers
or the state government since presently bonds can be paid off solely by the use of the
projects revenue, without risk to the taxpayers. See id) at 511.
(4) Allow for the elective reciprocal taxation of bond interest by the federal
government of state bonds and by the state governments of federal government bonds.
See Michael, supra note 145, at 1675-76.
(5) Repeal the exclusion for state bond interest on all outstanding issues, and replace
it with a tax credit of some percentage of the original value. See Maxwell, supra note
42, at 714. "All holders would be treated alike with no attempt to reckon whether or
not they had 'paid for' the exemption at the time of purchase." Id. For future issues of
state bonds a direct federal subsidy of a set amount of the bond's principal amount
would be provided to the state governments. See id.
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governments was first suggested in 1941 by Laurence Seltzer,' and
was adopted as the primary plan of reform by Congress in both 1969
and 1973.207 The President also recommended the plan in 1978, but
Congress rejected it.2"8
In the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the House Ways and Means
Committee adopted a proposal under which the Treasury would pay a
fixed percentage of the interest yield directly to state governments that
elected to accept the direct federal subsidy instead of issuing tax-exempt
bonds.2 9 The amount of direct federal interest subsidy could be
changed by the Treasury every quarter and was to be published in the
Federal Register. The direct interest subsidy would be at least 30% for
five years after the bill's effective date, and between 25% and 40%
thereafter. ° Allowing for a range in which the direct federal interest
206. See Lawrence H. Seltzer, Possibilities of Speeding the Elimination of Tax-Exempt
Securities, Nat'l Tax Assoc. Proceedings 189. 194-97 (1941). Seltzer's plan was to have the
Federal government make 15% annual or semi-annual payments to state governments for a
certain number of years. See id. at 194-95; see also FTCH, supra note 41, at 115-17; Maxwell,
supra note 42, at 713.
207. See WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826; Panel Discussion on General
Tax Reform Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 8, at 1171-240
(1973); see also SURREY, supra note 137, at 217; Galper & Petersen, supra note 33, at 212;
Morris, supra note 38, at 528-29; Surrey, supra note 164, at 9-10.
208. S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 145 (1978); see also Fortune, supra note 160,
at 6.
209. WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1827. The plan "provided that if a state
or local government elected to issue a taxable bond, the Treasury Department would be required
to pay periodically to the issuing government, as bond interest payments fell due, from thirty
percent to forty percent of the interest payments." Surrey, supra note 137, at 374. The proposal
was passed by the House. 115 CONG. REc. 22,808 (1969) However, it did not make it out of the
Senate Finance Committee due to heavy political pressure. The Senate Finance Committee said:
While there may be a problem here, the committee, because of its concern that any
action with respect to State and municipal bonds could have a deleterious effect on
the market for these bonds, and because of the high interest costs which are now
being paid on new issues of such bonds, concluded that any action possibly having
an impact on State and local government bond prices would be particularly
unfortunate.
Senate Comm. on Finance, Tax Reform Act of 1969, S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 218
(1969); see also OTT & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 108-09.
210. WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1827. For an economic analysis of the
direct federal interest subsidy plans, see Ackerman & Ott, supra note 142, at 398-99. The paper
details a very technical economic analysis of both compulsory and voluntary direct federal
interest subsidy plans. It concludes that a complete subsidy plan would create an overall
economic benefit because the federal government would gain revenue and state governments
could still borrow at a reduced rate. The paper goes on to say that this overall economic benefit
may not be present if the subsidy was somehow limited to only certain programs or done on a
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subsidy could fluctuate instead of a fixed interest subsidy amount was
intended to allow the Treasury to take into account market fluctuations
in the ratio of tax-exempt yields to taxable yields caused by the general
supply of and demand for credit in the money market."'
The direct federal interest subsidy plan's primary attractive feature
to state governments was that it would increase their access to the bond
markets." Under section 103, state governments are restricted to
marketing their bonds to buyers who are willing to take a lower interest
rate on state bonds in return for the exclusion of the interest received
from gross income.2 3 However, because many possible state bond
buyers already are exempt from federal taxation, they probably will not
purchase state bonds that provide a lower yield. 214 Providing subsidized taxable bonds would allow state governments to pay true market

voluntary basis. See id. at 398; see also Huefner, supra note 145, at 416. Huefner gives
economic arguments stating that the Federal government would probably benefit by a direct
subsidy versus tax-exemption. However, even if the increased tax collection was not sufficient
to cover the subsidy, there would be an increased efficiency in the federal support of state
governments and a decrease in the tax inequities of exemption. See id.; see also Morris, supra
note 38, at 531 (advocating a straight 40% interest subsidy instead of the variable subsidy of the
1969 House Bill).
211. See WAYS AND MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1827.
212. Surrey, supra note 137, at 373-74.
213. See supra notes 32-42 and accompanying text; see also Surrey, supra note 164, at 10.
The market for tax-exempt bonds is also shrinking due to other congressional reforms to the
issuance of tax-exempt bonds. George Friedlander, Tax Reform Hurt Municipal Bond Market,
Says Anthony Commission Member, 90 TAX NOTES TODAY 81-10 (Apr. 17, 1990). According
to the article, prior to the tax reforms of 1986 state bonds were purchased equally by property
and casualty insurance companies, commercial banks and individuals (including those entities
with pass-through taxation to individuals like bond funds, trusts, etc.). Now banks are not
purchasing state bonds since the interest and expenses incurred in purchasing the bonds are no
longer tax deductible under § 265(a)(2). See id.; ZIPF, supra note 3, at 141; Feenberg & Poterba,
supra note 164, at 4. Property and casualty insurance companies are not purchasing bonds due
to the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) provisions of § 55 et seq., which do not fully exclude
the interest on state bonds. Friedlander, supra. With two major purchasers of tax-exempt bonds
exiting the market this greatly increases the potential for market volatility. See id.; ZIPF, supra
note 3, at 49-51; Poterba, supra note 150, at 538; Thompson Statement, supra note 5, at 4. Due
primarily to § 265(a)(2) the amount of tax-exempt bonds which banks held decreased from 1985
to 1989 by $90.7 billion. See Thompson Statement, supra note 5, at 4.
214. For example, group pension funds, personal retirement plans and organizations exempt
from taxation under § 501 (i.e., hospitals, universities, etc.) will rarely purchase state bonds since
they are not taxed on the income anyway and desire a higher return. See Surrey, supra note 137,
at 211. There are other reasons for taxpayers to purchase state bonds, like increased security. See
ZiPF, supra note 3, at 75. "The issuance of taxable bonds would broaden the market for State
and local government debt because the higher yield taxable bonds would be attractive to
individuals in the lower marginal tax brackets and the tax-exempt institutions, e.g., pension funds
which purchase only higher yield taxable bonds." S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 145
(1978).
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rate interest and thereby have access to additional buyers, while not

affecting the amount of money they can receive from their bond
issues.215 This additional influx of buyers also would stabilize the
market for state bonds and would help to lessen or eliminate the
volatility in the bond market.2 16 These benefits to state governments
would have been cost-free to the federal government, because it was
estimated that "the revenue gained by taxation of the interest on [state
bonds would] more than offset the cost of the subsidy."2 7
A benefit to the federal government of the direct interest subsidy
plan is that the amount of the subsidy would be known."' Presently,
section 103 provides a benefit to state governments and the cost is
estimated in the expenditure budget.219 If the direct federal interest
subsidy plan were adopted, the subsidy would not be "secret," but a part
of the budget to be debated in Congress.2=
It was thought that the direct federal interest subsidy would appeal
to state governments because it met both the positive requirements of no
federal oversight and the possibility of an unlimited subsidy. 1 The

215. See SURREY, supra note 137, at 212. Surrey quotes a joint statement of several large
state and local government organizations on the acceptability of the subsidy plan:
The Federal Government should provide state and local governments with an
additional method for obtaining access to the credit markets. Specifically, the group
agrees that state and local governments should have the option of issuing fullytaxable obligations (of the character presently tax exempt under the Internal
Revenue Code) with the Federal Government obligated to pay to the issuer, without
any restrictions, a fixed percentage of the interest cost This percentage should be
set at a level sufficient to encourage widespread use of this option.
Id. at 216.
216. See ZiPF, supra note 3, at 49-51. In a six-month period in 1994, bonds increased in
yield from 5.80% to 7.50%, a 1.7% increase. This led to a 15% drop in the market price of
outstanding bonds, or about twice the decline of the stock market over the same period. See id,
at 51; see also Fortune, supra note 160, at 6. The loss of bank and insurance demand increases
both the volatility and interest rates higher than if these buyers were in the market. See
Thompson Statement, supra note 5, at 4.
217.

WAYS AND

MEANS REPORT, supra note 32, at 1828.

218. SURREY, supra note 137, at 220-21.
219. See, e.g., JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, ESTIMATE OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURFS FOR FISCAL YEARS 1998-2002, Table 1, reprinted in TAX NOTES TODAY, Dec. 16, 1997,
available in LEXIS 97 TNT 241.4. Tax expenditures are any "revenue losses attributable to
provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction
from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral of
tax liability." 2 U.S.C. § 622(3).
220. Of course, state governments probably would not want this to happen.
221. See Surrey, supra note 137, at 373-74.
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direct federal interest subsidy, however, was looked upon by state
governments as a "Trojan Horse," and just the first step toward the
ultimate elimination of section 10 3 .' Other influences that damaged
the chances of the direct federal interest subsidy to pass in Congress in
1969 were a chaotic monetary situation, lobbying efforts by investment
houses that dealt in tax-exempt bonds, the dependence of some state
officials on political contributions from those investment houses, a lack
of support by state and local jurisdictions, and a fundamental lack of
support from the Administration.
2. Efficiency and Equity
The direct federal interest subsidy plan is more efficient in some
ways and less in others than section 103 is presently. It is more efficient
because all of the intended federal benefit goes directly to state
governments, and there is no windfall to the individual bondholders.
This is true because all bondholders are taxed on the interest, with the
federal government merely redistributing a portion of the proceeds it
collects from the taxpayers back to the issuing state governments.
However, the plan is less efficient because it adds another layer of
government intervention and complexity. A portion of the Treasury
would have to be designated to collect the funds and to make sure they
are redistributed correctly in proportion to the state governments'
outstanding state bonds. This could possibly be done without any change
to the present tax form for taxpayers. Because most state bonds
presently are issued in registered form, the state governments could
inform the federal government of the total amount of interest paid (and
to whom) and would in turn receive a remittance of the specified portion
under the Code.
Another benefit of the direct federal interest subsidy plan is that it
would reduce the vertical and horizontal inequity between taxpayers.22'
Vertical inequity would be reduced, because higher-bracket taxpayers
would not be provided with any surplus interest payments on their
bonds. Horizontal inequity would be reduced because all taxpayers who
receive bond interest payments would be taxed, unlike in the present
system where some are taxed and others are not

222. See Hearings on Federal FinancingAuthority Before the Senate Comm on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 148-51 (1972) (statement of Daniel B.
Goldberg, Counsel, Municipal Finance Officers Association); Morris, supra note 38, at 529.
223. See SURREY, supra note 137, at 212; Surrey, supra note 137, at 374.
224. See Fortune, supra note 160, at 7.
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3. The Seltzer Plan's Achilles Heel
The major problem with the direct federal interest subsidy plan is
that it is in conflict with the principles of federalism underlying the
Constitution. These principles should not be disturbed unless there is no
better option. As Justice Marshall originally stated in McCulloch v.
Maryland,' the Constitution implicitly creates dual sovereignties-the
individual states on the one hand, and the federal government on the
other.2" These dual sovereignties create our federal system in which
there is a balance of power between a federal government of limited
powers, and states with reserved power. 7 The two powers are supposed to keep each other in check because "a healthy balance of power
between the States and the Federal Government will reduce the risk of
tyranny and abuse from either front." However, "[i]f this 'double
security' is to be effective, there must be a proper balance between the
States and the Federal Government. These twin powers will act as
mutual restraints only if both are credible. In the tension between federal
and state power lies the promise of liberty."229
For guidance into federalism and its principles, many have sought
insight from The FederalistPapers.The FederalistPapers were written
by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay at the time of the
creation of the Constitution, and were meant to create support for that
document.2" It has been said that "[a]side from the Constitution itself,

225. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819); see supra text accompanying notes 88-100.
226. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410. "The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 457 (1990); James G. O'Brien, Section 103-Tax-Free Interest on Certain Governmental
Obligations-Part1, 97 BANKING L.J. 357, 375 (1980) (stating "I.R.C. § 103 is a congressional
recognition of the separate sovereignty of the several states").
227. See McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 410; Gregory, 501 U.S. at 457-58.
228. See Gregory,501 U.S. at 458. The federal system also provides other advantages: (1)
it assures a decentralized government which is more sensitive to the local needs of its citizens,
(2) increases the opportunities of citizens to get involved in government, (3) allows for more
innovation and experimentation in government, (4) creates competition between States for
citizens and makes them more responsive to needs, and (5) places a check on abuses of
government power. See id. But see Harold J. Laski, The Obsolescence of Federalism, 98 NEw
REPUBLIC 367 (1939); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a
National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 906-08 (1994).
229. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 459.
230. See DOcuMENTs OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY 118 (Melvin
I. Urofsky ed., 1989) [hereinafter DOcuMENTs OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL]; see also Chris
Marks, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton and United States v. Lopez: The Supreme Court
Resuscitates the Tenth Amendment, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 541, 543 & n.12 (1997); Miller &
Glick, supra note 16, at 36-37.
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no other source is considered as authoritative as The FederalistPapers
in determining the intent of the Framers.""1
The federalism question is not whether the direct federal interest
subsidy plan would be constitutional or not; it most likely would pass
constitutional scrutiny. 2 The problem lies more in the fact that the
direct federal interest subsidy plan would be an unwise course of action
because it would undermine the federalist principles of the Constitution. 3
The direct federal interest subsidy plan would weaken federalist
principles for two related reasons. First, the federal government would
be directly subsidizing the state governments. The direct federal interest
subsidy plan would hinder federalism because it gives the federal
government more influence over state affairs, thereby upsetting the
balance of power. Alexander Hamilton stated that if the states lose the
ability to provide for themselves this would fuel fears of "the entire
exclusion and destruction of the State governments."2 4
This increase in federal Government's power might be actual or
psychological. The federal government would actually increase in power
vis-h-vis the states by giving itself the power of the purse and the ability
(or threat) of placing additional restrictions on receipt of the direct
federal interest subsidy. 5 This would just exacerbate an already

231. DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 230. Justice Marshall stated
"[i]n the course of the argument, The Federalist [Papers have] been quoted; and the opinions
expressed by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to be entitled to great respect
in expounding the constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which exceeds their merit."
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431.
232. See Baker, 485 U.S. at 515. But see id. at 530-34 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice
O'Connor stated in her dissent to the Baker opinion that, in her view, "the Tenth Amendment
and principles of federalism inherent in the Constitution prohibit Congress from taxing or
threatening to tax the interest paid on state and municipal bonds." Id. at 531 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
233. "Mhe erosion of state sovereignty is likely to occur a step at a time.... Federal
taxation of state activities is inherently a threat to state sovereignty." Id. at 533 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); see also Miller & Glick, supra note 16, at 34. "Because the states have constitutionally protected sovereign powers, any action Congress may take that invades or restrains a state's
sovereign powers should be scrutinized and carefully confined:' Id.
234. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 196 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rositer ed., 1961).
235. "It is contended by those who champion the exclusion of municipal bond interest from
taxation that the exemption is an instrument of federalism, i.e., that it promotes our system of
dual sovereignties." Martori & Bliss, supra note 57, at 210; see General Tax Reform: Panel
Discussions Before the Committee on Ways and Means, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1171 (1973)
(statement of John D. Driggs, Mayor, Phoenix, Ariz.). "Any alteration in the tax-exempt bond
market would weaken local financial autonomy, and there would be a great tendency for the
Federal Government to fill the vacuum. Even [the] remote possibility of this occurring is
unacceptable." Id. at 1172. However, Mayor Driggs was in favor of creating additional methods
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growing problem.236 As one author noted, federalism is hampered
because the "large increase in federal spending has changed the
character of the United States from a state government dominated
society to a federal government dominated society." 7 Psychological
problems are present due to the fact the persons or entities subsidized
"do not-or more likely do not want to-recognize that they are
beneficiaries of a federal subsidy program." 8 This could create
resentment toward the subsidy provider due to a feeling of dependency
on the provider and of the inability of the populace to take care of their
own needs.
Second, although Congress may create laws that upset the balance of
power between the states and federal government, it should not create
laws that impede federalism principles unless it has no better choice.
for state governments to obtain funding for local projects. See id.
236. "The larger amounts of money now being provided to the states results in a greater
opportunity for federal government coercion." James V. Corbelli, Tower of Power: South Dakota
v. Dole and the Strength of the Spending Power, 49 U. PITT. L. REv. 1097, 1105 (1988). It is
interesting to note that in The FederalistPapers,Alexander Hamilton did not believe the federal
government would ever want to interfere in the affairs of state or local governments. Hamilton
believed that Federal regulation of state domestic policy "appears ... to hold out slender
allurements to ambition (of the federal government)." THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 234,
at 118.
237. Corbelli, supra note 236, at 1105-06. Other authors also have echoed this sentiment:
"[t]o function as a state, the body politic must have at least a minimum of its powers protected
against outside interference, including control over ... the capacity to tax and spend." Lewis
B. Kaden, Politics,Money, and State Sovereignty: The JudicialRole, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847,
851 (1979).
238. McDANIEL ET AL., supra note 83, at 339. This psychological problem also could be
present because it might shift people's views away from the States and toward the federal
government. When assuring the people that the federal government would not become too
powerful, Alexander Hamilton argued this would not happen since States and local government
would have the natural affection of all. See THE FEDERALIST No. 17, supra note 234, at 119.
He wrote that
[i]t is a known fact in human nature that its affections are commonly weak in
proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the object. Upon the same principle
that a man is more attached to his family than to his neighborhood, to his
neighborhood than to the community at large, the people of each State would be
apt to feel a stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the
government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by
a much better administration of the latter.
Id. If the people's affections were drawn more to the Federal Government, Hamilton noted
"State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere that
the federal power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously administered." THE
FEDERALIST No. 46, supra note 234, at 295. However, the "certain sphere" of the Federal
Government seems to be ever widening.
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The federal courts have used this premise as a doctrine of interpretation. 9 The Supreme Court has stated that "Congress may impose its
will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas traditionally regulated
by the States. This is an extraordinary power in a federalist system. It
is a power that we must assume Congress does not exercise lightly."2 '
Therefore, if there is another possible way in which to structure the
federal subsidy to state governments, this route should be taken.
Because a direct federal interest subsidy would impede principles of
If a
federalism, an indirect federal subsidy would be preferable.
direct subsidy were not used, an indirect federal subsidy could be
completed by allowing a deduction from income or a credit against taxes
for individual taxpayers. This is the method that is used in the Fitch
Tripartite plan, discussed below, and the Credit-Equity plan, presented
in Part VI.
B. Fitch TripartitePlan
Another proposal for the replacement of section 103 was suggested
by Lyle Fitch in the 1950s. The Fitch proposal breaks down the
question of replacing section 103 into three parts: (1) the taxation of
present holders of outstanding bonds; (2) the taxation of future
purchasers of outstanding issues of state bonds (i.e., buyers who
purchase bonds from present holders); and (3) the taxation of future
issues of state bonds. 3
The rationale of the tripartite treatment was to increase efficiency by
eliminating the "leaked" federal subsidy, which presently inures to the
higher bracket taxpayers. 2" For present holders of outstanding bonds,
the Fitch proposal attempts to recreate the results that would have
existed if the bond holder had purchased taxable bonds.245 This result
is achieved by constructively increasing the amount of interest income
received from state bonds, taxing the entire amount, and allowing a

239. "The [Supreme] Court has held routinely that the balance of federalism should not be
disturbed unless the Court has a clear warrant for doing so." Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed
Economics of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1183, 1276

(forthcoming 1998).
240. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991).

241. Not unlike the deduction from income for charitable contributions made to churches.
While a direct federal subsidy of churches would be a violation of the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment of the Constitution, an indirect federal subsidy is permitted. See supra note

31.
242. See FITCH, supra note 41.
243. See id.at 81.

244. See id. at 89.
245. See id.
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credit of the constructive increase against the additional tax.' Greater
efficiency is achieved for future bondholders of presently issued or
future issues of state bonds by creating a permanent percentage interest
differential for the treatment of state and taxable bondsu 7
1. Tax Treatment of Present Holders of
Outstanding State Bonds
For present holders of outstanding state bonds, the Fitch proposal
would tax state bond income received, while simultaneously leaving
bondholders with the same amount of disposable income they would
have had if they had originally purchased a comparable taxable
bond." The taxation of bond income eliminates the excess tax savings
enjoyed by high tax bracket bondholders, as shown in Part Im, above.
This taxation of excess savings eliminates the inefficiencies present

since adoption of section

1 0 3 ."9

The Fitch proposal accomplishes this by the following steps:'
1. Calculate the bondholder's taxable income as if the state bonds
held received the same interest rate as a comparable taxable bond
purchased at the same time the original state bond was purchased
("constructive" income)."5
2. Compute the income tax due for the tax year on the amount of
income determined in Step 1.

246. See iULat 90; see also Weiss, supra note 4, at 1972-73. Weiss presents a plan which
is essentially the same as the Fitch plan: the only difference is the derivation. Fitch starts with
the assumption that he wants to adjust state bond income and give a credit to equal the taxable
bond after taxes. See FITCH, supra note 41, at 81. Weiss starts with a credit which is included
in a taxpayer's income, taxed and later credited back to the taxpayer after the taxes are set equal.
Weiss, supra note 4, at 1972. However, due to errors in the footnotes the derivation and proofs
of the Weiss plan are unclear. See id. at 1973 (In note 50, x equals 7.5 and not 5 as the author
claims. In note 49, brackets are missing. There are also needless complications of equations in
notes 47 and 50 because the equation x = i-c was previously solved in note 43. As in note 43
for i=10 and c=2.5, x=10-2.5=7.5 when note 50 is solved correctly. Additionally, the first
paragraph on page 1973 should presumably read "10%" and not "0%").
247. See FITCH, supra note 41, at 101.
248. See id. at 83-84; Kirby, supra note 39, at 692-93; Maxwell, supra note 42, at 714.
"Comparable" taxable bond would most likely be a high grade corporate taxable bond. See
FITCH, supra note 41, at 93. Buyers might want to purchase state bonds since they may offer
greater security than private issue bonds.
249. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 693.
250. See FITCH, supra note 41, at 90.
251. This recreates the situation which would have existed if buyers of exempts had
purchased comparable taxable bonds.
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3. Determine the amount of credit allowed against the tax
determined in Step 2. The credit is determined by, taking the excess
of the total constructive income received from the state bonds in Step
1, less the amount of income actually received from state bonds. 2
4. Deduct the credit determined in Step 3 against the tax
determined in Step 2.
5. The bondholder would pay the greater of the tax determined in
Step 4, or the tax calculated on actual taxable income, excluding
state bond income. 3
The Fitch proposal calculates the tax due assuming that a taxpayer
originally purchased a taxable bond instead of a tax-exempt bond. The
difference between the constructive and actual income received on state
bonds is then taken as a credit against the additional tax computed, but

not against any of the taxpayer's other tax liability.' The effect is to
calculate the taxpayer's income tax assuming a higher yield on the state

bond, but to allow a credit against the tax for the amount of foregone
income the taxpayer would have received if the taxpayer had invested
in higher yield bondsY 5 In this way, the higher marginal taxpayer
bondholder would not enjoy a larger benefit than others from the tax
exemption and would receive the "correct" amount of tax exemption
due.
For example, assume a taxpayer purchases a $10,000 state bond with
an interest rate of 7%, thus receiving an annual yield of $700, while a
252. Credit = (total constructive state bond interest income) - (actual state bond interest
income).
253. See FITCH, supra note 41, at 90; Kirby, supra note 39, at 693. This means the holders
of outstanding state bonds could not receive a credit against their other tax liability.
254. See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 91; Kirby, supra note 39, at 693. The calculated credit
amount cannot reduce any other taxpayer tax liability except that of the tax on the constructive
state bond interest income. See FITCH, supra note 41, at 91.
255. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 693. Fitch uses the following example:
[A]ssume that a bondholder holds a 5 per cent municipal maturing in 1955, which
he purchased in 1934 for $1,100. Assume that the relative differential allowed by
the Treasury is 0.30, and that the tax rate on the bondholder's marginal income is
50 per cent. The annual income from the bond is the dividend of $50 minus the
amortized premium of $10 (using a straight-line basis of amortization) or $40. The
hypothetical gross taxable income would be ($40 * 1.30) $52. The gross tax would
be ($52 * .50) $26; the net tax is the gross tax minus the tax credit of $12, or $14.
The rate in the "break-even" tax bracket would be 23 per cent; if the tax rate on
the bondholder's marginal income were 23 per cent or less, he would not pay any
tax under this formula.
FITCH, supra note 41, at 90-91.
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comparable taxable bond receives 10% interest or $1000 (a relative
differential between the state and taxable bonds of 1.4286).' Assuming a 40% marginal rate taxpayer, the proposal would work as follows:
1. The bondholder's constructive income would be $1000 from
the state bond since comparable taxable bonds receive 10% interest.
2. The income tax due would be $400 (40% tax rate * $1000
constructive income).
3. The amount of the credit would be the constructive income
received ($1000) less the amount of income actually received from
the bond ($700), or a $300 credit.
4. After taking the credit in Step 3, the additional tax due would
be $100 ($400 tax - $300 credit).
. 5. Since the additional tax due ($100) is greater than the actual
tax due ($0), the taxpayer would have an additional $100 of income
tax liability.2
Table 2 shows the results using the same assumptions as above for
four hypothetical marginal tax brackets of 40%, 30%, 20% and 10%.
Table 2
Tax
Rate

Bond
"In.
come"

Tax on
"Income,

Credit?"

Tax
Due

40%

$1000

30%
20%
10%

$1000
$1000
$1000

$400

$300

$300
$200
$100

$300
$300
$300

$100
$0
$0
$0

Interest
rate on
compar
-able
taxable
bond

Effective
taxexempt
interest
rate

10%

6%

10%
10%
10%

7%
7%
7%

A noteworthy point concerning the Fitch proposal is the way that it
treats taxpayers in the lower brackets. The "break even" (or as Fitch
says, "marginal") tax bracket in this example would be 30%, because
any taxpayer below this bracket would not have to pay tax on bond

256. The relative differential is determined by $700(x) = $1000. Therefore, x = $1000 I
$700 = 1.4286.

257. This example assumes the taxpayer has no other taxable income.
258. The same amount of credit would be present for all brackets. The credit amount would
be determined by taking the constructive income received for a taxable bond ($1000), less the
amount of state bond income actually received ($700).
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interest income. However, taxpayers in the tax brackets lower than the
30% rate would not receive any additional benefit from the purchase of
state bonds because they could not use the credit received against other
tax liability. For all tax brackets lower than the break even tax bracket,
the effective state bond yield would be only 7% interest because the
Fitch proposal only allows a credit to the amount of tax calculated on
interest income.
2. Taxation of Future Buyers of Outstanding and
New Issues of State Bonds
Under the Fitch proposal, the method of taxing state bond interest of
future buyers of outstanding state bonds and of new issues of state
bonds would be treated almost the same as that discussed above. The
primary difference would be that the "constructive" state bond income
in Step 1 would be calculated with a fixed, instead of a variable,
differential.
The main concern of the Fitch proposal's treatment of future buyers
of outstanding bonds is protecting the present owners of outstanding
issues who wish to sell their bonds before maturity, while eliminating
the "leaked" (or windfall) subsidy to high-income buyers. 9 If the
interest income on outstanding state bonds is taxed, those outstanding
bonds would not be as attractive to buyers, would lose value, and the
holders might suffer large losses." Future buyers would have no
reason to prefer outstanding state bonds, because there would be no
windfall subsidy due to the partial taxation of state bond interest present
" ' This lack of a windfall subsidy would discourage
in the Fitch plan.26
future buyers from purchasing outstanding state bonds, because these
bonds would provide a lower yield than other bonds on the market.62
The concern with the treatment of future issues of state bonds is to
make the bonds attractive to potential buyers, while still affording state
governments the opportunity to pay lower interest."6 To make future
issues of state bonds an attractive purchase while still providing a
subsidy to state governments would require some sort of credit to future
buyers of state bonds.
Under the Fitch proposal, future buyers of outstanding and new
issues of bonds would be treated similarly. The overall plan would work
exactly as it did for current owners, with two major differences. First,
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 99-100; Kirby, supra note 39, at 695.
See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 99; Kirby, supra note 39, at 695.
Unless they were at the margin, in which case they would be indifferent.
See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 99-100; Kirby, supra note 39, at 695.
See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 113, 117-18; Kirby, supra note 39, at 697.
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the yield differential would be set and determined at the time of the
repeal of section 103 and would remain the same thereafter.' This
fixed differential would keep the market prices of outstanding state
bonds higher than if the state bonds were fully taxable, and therefore
would reduce the possible losses to owners of outstanding state
bonds.26 Second, the credit received could be used to offset other tax
liability of the bond holder.'
3. Comments on the Fitch Proposal
The primary benefit of the Fitch proposal is that it eliminates the
inefficiencies presently inherent in section 103. This is done by treating
taxpayers as if they had purchased a taxable bond, and then taxing them
on the income. All taxpayers would initially be taxed on the income
received from state bonds. The proposal would then give a taxpayer a
credit against that tax for the amount of income which would have been
obtained as a result of the purchase of a taxable bond.267 In this way,
the higher marginal rate bondholders would no longer receive any
unnecessary and excess benefits from the tax exemption. They would
owe tax as if they had purchased a comparable taxable bond, but receive
a credit for the interest which they did not receive from the taxable bond
due to the lower interest rate received on the state bond.2a
The plan is more equitable than our present system. State bondholders in the higher tax brackets would not be given any extra incentives
to purchase state bonds because the windfall federal subsidy would be
eliminated.' However, the bonds would have only partial vertical
equity, for present holders of state bonds could not use the credit
received against their other tax liability. As Table 2 shows, this leads to
a different after-tax bond interest rate as compared to those bondholders
who fully utilized the credit received against the tax that would have
been imposed by the Fitch plan.
The major problem involved in the implementation of the Fitch
proposal is that the plan is extremely complicated 7 The complexity
264. See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 101-04; Kirby, supra note 39, at 695.
265. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 695.
266. See FrrCH, supra note 41, at 102.
267. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 693.
268. See id. "This solution seems ideal; the [inefficiency] of undue tax savings is
eliminated, the higher surtax brackets are respected, and the actual investment made by the
bondholder in the tax exemption feature of the bond is fully recognized. No undue loss is visited
upon the purchaser, yet no advantage is accorded to his tax exemption." l
269. See supra pt. V.B.1.-2.
270. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 693. The increased complexity also could drive up
transaction costs as practitioners try to learn the new laws. See Michael, supra note 145, at 1672.
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of the Fitch proposal lies primarily in the difficulty of determining the
yields of taxable and nontaxable securities for past bond issues."
Fitch stated that these schedules of rate differentials would be prepared
by the Treasury and "would be rough and differentials should be high
enough to give bondholders the benefit of any doubt."'2 These tables
would be based upon the rate differentials of the yields between the
highest grades of taxable and nontaxable securities.'
The task of
preparing schedules of rate differentials between state bonds and taxable
bonds for each quarter for as far back as the oldest outstanding state
bond (potentially 40 or 50 years) would, at best, be a daunting task for
the Treasury. Finding the information might not be that difficult; what
would be more complex would be determining what taxable bonds
would be "comparable" and then implementing the system for the
taxpayer. Also, taxpayers certainly would not like the sight of a tax form
or schedule with pages of columns of state bonds every quarter for the
past thirty years.
A method to avoid this complexity is to utilize a fixed yield
differential for all past issues and outstanding tax-exempt securities*
The rate differentials then would be standard and would apply for all
taxpayers, regardless of when the bonds were purchased. However, if a
fixed rate differential were used, inequities would be present since a
large yield differential would generate too great a credit in many cases,
while a small yield differential would cause bondholders to lose some
of their investment. 5
The overall complexity of the Fitch proposal is what makes it
impossible to enact into law. Using "Ockham's razor," any plan that is
used to replace the federal subsidy should be simple to implement and
not increase the complexity of the Code unnecessarily. 276 Under the

271. See OTr & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 101; Kirby, supra note 39, at 693; Maxwell,
supra note 42, at 714. Maxwell states that, "The Fitch scheme would be administratively
difficult. Establishment of differentials at the time of purchase of exempts in order to calculate
gain or loss of holders would be vexatious and would, at best, provide rough justice." Maxwell,
supra note 42, at 714.
272. FrrcH, supra note 41, at 93.

273. See id.; see also Kirby, supra note 39, at 693.
274. See Kirby, supra note 39, at 694.

275. See id.
276. William of Ockham (1285-1349) was an English monk and philosopher. Ockham's

(or Occam's) razor also is referred to as the Law of Economy or Law of Parsimony. It states
that "what can be done with fewer [assumptions] is done in vain with more." Ockham's razor
has been used to support the idea that if two concepts are equal, the simpler one must be
preferred; or put another way, that there should be economy in explanation. See 8 THE
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOsOPHy 307 (Paul Edwards ed., 1972); THE NEw ENCYCLOPAEDIA
BRrrANNICA, 8 Micropaedia 867 (1991); see also SCOTT ADAMS, STILL PUMPED FROM USING
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Fitch plan, taxpayers would first increase their state bond income,
calculate a credit amount, and then subtract this from their tax liability.

This would be a very difficult three-part calculation, even without taking
into account the volume of tables that taxpayers might be forced to use
to calculate the amount of income from their outstanding state
bonds.2' While the goals of increased efficiency of the Fitch plan are
praiseworthy, the method which is used is too unwieldy to be considered. 278
As will be shown in the next Part, the optimal subsidy plan would
be efficient and equitable, simple to implement, and would not invoke
federalism concerns. This is what could be accomplished by adopting
the Credit-Equity plan discussed in Part VI.
VI. THE "CREDIT-EQUITY" PLAN

It has been shown in Part II that section 103 is both inefficient and
inequitable.279 However, as pointed out in Part IV, there may be valid
reasons for the federal government to subsidize state governments for
projects that provide genuine public goods.' To maintain the subsidy
function would necessitate the reform of the laws relating to state bonds
but not necessarily the outright repeal of section 103. While past
proposals have provided for the retention of the federal subsidy, as
previously discussed, they have either raised federalism concerns,"' or
are too complex to implement.'
Any change in this area of the law should be efficient in providing
the federal subsidy to the state governments, treat taxpayers equitably,
and not invoke concerns of federalism. If federalism concerns prevent
the use of a direct federal subsidy to state governments, another
incentive is required to encourage investors to purchase state bonds.

THE

MOUSE 95 (1996).

277. See supra text accompanying note 270. "Erosion of taxpayer morale is not an
unimportant side effect of ... confusion-if taxpayers think the whole system is unknowable,
the temptation to use self help to fashion their own private tax shelters becomes well nigh
irresistible." James S. Eustice, Tax Complexity and the Tax Practitioner,45 TAX L. REV. 7, 19
(1989).
278. The Fitch proposal also goes against the goals of making the Internal Revenue Code
easier to read and understand. See supra notes 270-74. "Voluntary compliance, so critical to the
tax law's integrity, depends upon its intelligibility." Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some
Causes, Consequences,and Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 24 (1992).
279. See supra text accompanying notes 145-85.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 188-99.
281. See supra text accompanying notes 225-41.
282. See supra text accompanying notes 267-78.
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Such an incentive could consist of a credit against tax liability for
taxpayers who purchase state bonds as compared to taxable bonds.0 3
In this Part, a proposal is made for a taxpayer credit plan (the CreditEquity plan) that would do to the following: (1) be efficient, because the
entire federal subsidy would be provided to state governments rather to
individual taxpayers; (2) be equitable, because all taxpayers would
receive the same after-tax benefits; and (3) not invoke federalism
concerns. An added bonus of the Credit-Equity plan is that it would not
add any layers of additional government bureaucracy as would the
taxable state subsidy plan or a central bank plan.'
Another benefit is that the Credit-Equity proposal provides consistent
results for all taxpayers subject to different marginal rates, while
providing the entire federal subsidy (in terms of revenue dollars lost to
the federal government) to state governments and not to high-bracket
taxpayers. For example, if Congress were to set the subsidy at 40%, that
is what state governments would receive-a 40% reduction in their cost
of borrowing funds.
A. The Mechanics of the Credit-EquityPlan
The proposed Credit-Equity plan requires that Congress determine
the amount of the subsidy it desires to grant to state governments in the
form of a lower interest rate for state governments wishing to borrow
funds."5 This federal subsidy would be based on the difference in
interest that state governments would pay on their issued bonds, as
compared with the interest payable on a taxable bond. For example,
suppose Congress provided the state governments a 40% subsidy on
funds borrowed through the issuance of bonds. If taxable bonds were
selling at 10%, the maximum interest which the state governments
would need to provide in order to attract buyers would be 6% (40%
less), thus saving the state governments 4% in interest payments. The

283. A credit against tax is subtracted from any tax liability owed. See RUTHERF-ORD, supra
note 9, at 453. A credit is more useful to a taxpayer than a deduction since a credit reduces a
taxpayer's liability dollar for dollar, while a deduction only reduces tax by the amount of a
taxpayer's average rate of tax. "Mhe use of credits... can wholly resolve the apparent conflict
between incentives and equity." Weiss, supra note 4, at 1951.
284. See supra note 205.

285. In 1969, the interest rate for tax-exempt bonds reached 75% of the interest given on
comparable taxable bonds, from its historical ratio of around 60%. See WAYS AND MEANS
REPORT, supra note 32, at 1826; SURREY, supra note 137, at 210; Poterba, supra note 150, at
540. See generally BUREAU OF CENSUS, supra note 7, at 522, No. 804; Federal Reserve Board,
Flow of Funds Accounts (for the historic differential between yields of taxable and tax-exempt

bonds).
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amount of the interest subsidy could be set to either market variations
(such as in the Fitch plan, above) or to a fixed differential."
After the amount of state subsidy has been determined by Congress,
the Credit-Equity plan would be employed. An equality facto 287 (see
Appendix for details and mathematical equations) would be determined
for each marginal rate as given in sections 1 (individuals, trusts and
estates) and 11 (corporations) of the Code. Each taxpayer would then
multiply the equality factor against the total amount of tax-exempt state
bond income received during the tax year to determine the credit against
tax or the increase in tax liability. 8 Therefore, for each different
marginal rate bracket an equality factor would be determined by which

to multiply a taxpayer's state bond income. In this way each taxpayer
would calculate a separate amount of credit or income to decrease or
increase their tax liability.
B. An Example
Here is an example of how the plan would work. Assume that a
taxpayer purchases a $10,000 state bond with an interest rate of 6%,
thereby receiving an annual yield of $600. Also assume for the sake of
simplicity and clarity that only four marginal tax-brackets exist: 40%,

30%, 20% and

10%."9

If Congress decided to allow for a 40% subsidy to the state governments, the equality factor" would be 0% for the 40% bracket taxpay-

286. In 1978, the Senate proposed a plan that allowed taxpayers either to exclude the
interest received on state bonds from gross income or elect to include in gross income 167% of
the interest received from state bonds. Then taxpayers electing to include 167% of the interest
received in their gross income would be allowed a credit of 67% of the interest amount against
tax computed on taxable income. The report states the result to taxpayers making the election
would be a 40% increase to the state bond interest income received. S.REP. No. 1263, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 14,2, 146-47 (1978).
287. As explained in more detail below and in the Appendix, it is called an "equality
facto?' because when multiplied by a taxpayer's state bond interest, taxpayers of different
marginal rates receive the same effective after-tax interest rate from a taxable bond. Thus, the
factor (a number when multiplied with another forms a product), when multiplied by state bond
interest income, makes everyone equal in their comparable after-tax holdings of taxable bond
interest.
288. Most taxpayers likely will have a credit amount. An inclusion in gross income will
only be necessary if the percent amount of the interest subsidy which Congress decides upon is
less than the percentage rate of the highest marginal rate of tax. See infra pt. VI.C.
A question does exist as to whether the credit would be refundable if a taxpayer did not
have enough off-setting tax liability against which to use the credit. See infra notes 295-96 and
accompanying text.
289. See supra note 9 for the definition of marginal tax rate.
290. The equalityfactorwould be calculated as: equalityfactor= (R - R') / (I- R') where
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er, negative 16.67% for the 30% bracket, negative 33.33% for the 20%
bracket and negative 50.0% for the taxpayers in the 10% bracket. 9'
The results of using the equality factor against the state bond interest
received can be seen in Table 3. When the equality factor is multiplied
by the $600 state bond income received this would allow for a credit of
$0 for the 40% bracket taxpayer, $100 for the 30% bracket taxpayer,
$200 for the 20% bracket taxpayer and $300 for the 10% bracket
taxpayer. This amount of credit allowed for each taxpayer would
provide each the same after-tax benefit as a 10% taxable bond. Table 3
shows a comparison for different taxpayers, when the subsidy is set at
40%.
Table 3
Interest
Rate on
Comparable Taxable
Bonds

Effective
State Bond
Interest
Rate

10.0%
10.0%

6.0%
7.0%

Tax Rate

State
Bond
Yield

Equality
Factor

Credit
Amount

40.00%
30.00%

$600.00
$600.00

0.00%
-16.67%

$0
$100

20.00%

$600.00

-33.33%

$200

10.0%

8.0%

10.00%

$600.00

-50.00%

$300

10.0%

9.0%

There are two aspects of Table 3 that are important to note. First, all
taxpayers from each of the different marginal rates would receive an
after-tax effective rate of return for state bonds which equals the aftertax rate of return on taxable bonds yielding 10% interest. This can be
accomplished by allowing varying amounts of credit due on each
taxpayer's marginal rate of tax. Taxpayers would be able to decrease
their tax liability dollar for dollar, giving them the same after-tax
consequences as the purchase of a taxable bond upon which the interest
would be taxed at their marginal tax rate. This would mean that their net
income would be the same in either case. Therefore, each taxpayer

R1 equals the amount of subsidy determined by Congress and R equals the marginal interest rate
for each taxpayer. See infra app. of Article for mathematical details.
291. Let the subsidy = R' = 0.40 and equalityfactor = (R - R') /(1 - R').
If R = 0.40, the equality factor= (0.40 - 0.40) / (0.60) = 0 / 0.60 = 0.
If R = 0.30, the equalityfactor= (0.30 - 0.40) / (0.60) = (- 0.10) /0.60 = (- 0.1667).
If R = 0.20, the equality factor= (0.20 - 0.40) / (0.60) = (- 0.20) 0.60 = (- 0.3333).
If R = 0.20, the equalityfactor= (0.10 - 0.40) / (0.60) = (- 0.30) I 0.60 = (- 0.50).

A negative equality factor shows a credit is allowed. If the equality factor is positive,
additional tax liability is incurred. See, e.g., infra note 298.
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should be indifferent to the purchase of either a taxable or state bond,
all else being equal. 2
Second, the issuing state government would be paying out only $600
of interest to each marginal rate taxpayer. This means that the equality
factor is providing a consistent result for all taxpayers subject to
different marginal rates, while providing a 40% subsidy to state
governments on their cost of borrowing funds. Therefore, if Congress
were to set the subsidy at 40%, that is exactly what state governments
would receive-a 40% reduction in their cost of borrowing funds.
The Credit-Equity plan would allow lower income taxpayers to
receive a higher effective interest rate on the state bonds than is
currently allowed under section 103. In addition to the exclusion of
interest from state bonds, a 10% marginal rate taxpayer requires an
additional incentive when compared with the 40% marginal rate
taxpayer to purchase a state bond with a 6% interest rate. As seen in
Table 3, the 10% marginal rate taxpayer would be taxed 10% on the
$1000 of interest received from a taxable bond and would keep $900
after paying tax.293
Because the 10% marginal rate taxpayer is taxed only $100 on the
$1000 interest income received from the taxable bond, this means at
least a 9% return is required on state bonds to make both types of bonds
an equal after-tax investment. This would be accomplished by allowing
the 10% marginal taxpayer a $300 credit to use against tax due. In this
manner the total amount received from the state bond would be $600 in
tax-exempt interest, and a $300 credit to use against other taxes. When
all is said and done, the 10% marginal taxpayer will have received a
$900 benefit from the purchase of the state bond, or the entire 9% return
required to make the purchase of the state bond attractive.
The position of the 10% marginal rate taxpayer is in contrast to the
40% marginal rate taxpayer, who must only exclude all interest income
received from a state bond to arrive at the same after-tax yield on a 6%
state bond as a 10% taxable bond. After paying tax (using our $10,000
10% taxable bond and 6% state bond from the above example) the
taxpayer will end up with $600 in both the taxable and the state bond
situations.'
292. Economic theory suggests that consumer preference is convex, or that consumers (here
bond buyers) faced with a choice between two goods will select some of each, instead of
purchasing all of one or the other. Therefore, consumers should be indifferent, economically
speaking, to which types of bonds (taxable or tax-exempt) they purchase. VARIAN, supra note

30, at 48.
293. $1000 (interest income) * 10% (tax rate) = $100 tax liability. $1000 - $100 = $900
kept after tax paid.
294. On a $10,000 taxable bond receiving 10% interest the taxpayer will receive $1000 in
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A question does exist whether any credit would be refundable. To
make the interest allocation work out correctly, a refundable credit
would have to be required.29 Also, allowing for a credit to tax-exempt
organizations that are state bondholders would further expand the market
for state bonds. 29 This would be true because tax-exempt organizations would receive a higher yield on state bonds, and this would
increase the effective interest rates they receive. 9
C. Credit-Equity Plan's Use When the FederalSubsidy
Is Less than the Highest MarginalRate
The equalityfactor also would be used when the level of the federal
subsidy determined by Congress is less than the highest marginal tax
bracket. When the amount of subsidy is less than the highest marginal
bracket, taxpayers in all brackets greater than the subsidy level would
include an additional amount in their tax liability. Apart from additional
tax liability for taxpayers with marginal rates greater than the subsidy
rate, the plan would work out exactly the same as before.
An example of this is as follows. Assume a 30% subsidy is provided
by Congress and that a taxpayer purchases a $10,000 state bond with an
interest rate of 7% (annual yield of $700). The equalityfactor would be
14.29% for the 40% bracket, 0% for the 30% bracket, negative 14.29%

for the 20% bracket and negative 28.57% for taxpayers in a 10%
bracket.298 This would allow for an additional $100 of income tax

yearly interest payments. With no allowance for deductions or exemptions, the $1000 will be
subject to the 40% tax rate giving a tax of $400. Therefore, after the payment of tax the 40%
marginal rate taxpayer is left with $600.
295. A Senate plan proposed in 1978 for the replacement of § 103 did not allow for any
refund of the credit except to the entities which were exempt from tax. See S. REP. No. 1263,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 147 (1978).
296. Private pension trusts, state and local retirement funds, and educational and charitable
institutions would be attracted to the bonds if they were allowed a credit. See SURREY, supra
note 137, at 211.
297. See supra note 214. It is unclear what effect the Credit-Equity plan would have on the
federal revenue stream. There would be some effect, especially if tax-exempt organizations were
to get a credit refund. The effect could be negative, if the credit given to tax-exempt
organization were not offset by additional income received by the greater efficiency of the plan.
While the federal revenue effects are uncertain, the Credit-Equity plan still should be adopted
since it is efficient in allocating the federal subsidy to state governments, equitable to all
taxpayers, and increases the market for state bonds.
298. Let the subsidy = R' = 0.30 and equalityfactor = (R - R') / (1 - R').
If R = 0.40, the equality factor= (0.40 - 0.30) / (0.70) = 0.10 / 0.70 = 0.1429.
If R = 0.30, the equality factor= (0.30 - 0.30) / (0.70) = 0 / 0.70 = 0.
If R = 0.20, the equality factor= (0.20 - 0.30) / (0.70) = (- 0.10) / 0.70 = (- 0.1429).
If R = 0.20, the equality factor= (0.10 - 0.30) / (0.70) = (- 0.20) / 0.70 =- 0.2857).
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liability for the 40% bracket taxpayer, $0 for the 30% bracket taxpayer,
a $100 credit for the 20% bracket taxpayer and a $200 credit for the
10% bracket taxpayer.2" This amount of additional tax liability or
credit for each taxpayer would provide each the same after-tax benefit
as a 10% taxable bond.
Table 4 shows a comparison for different taxpayers when the subsidy
is set at 30%.
Table 4
Tax
Rate
40.00%
30.00%
20.00%
10.00%

State
Bond
Yield
$700.00
$700.00
$700.00
$700.00

Equality
Factor

Credit
Amount

14.29%
0.00%
-14.29%
-28.57%

[$100]
$0
$100
$200

Interest Rate
on Comparable Taxable Bonds
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%
10.0%

Effective
State Bond
Interest Rate
6.0%
7.0%
8.0%
9.0%

As can be seen from Table 4, taxpayers with different marginal rates
all would have the same after-tax rate as they would for a comparable
taxable bond. This would be achieved by allowing for a credit to those
who ordinarily would not purchase a 7% state bond (the taxpayers in the
20% and 10% marginal tax brackets) as compared to a 10% taxable
bond, and adding an additional amount to the tax liability of the 40%
taxpayer, to prevent any "windfall" for that taxpayer as is permitted
under section 103 in its current form.
D. Why This Plan Is Superiorto Other Plans
The proposal for an equality factor to be used for each separate tax
bracket is a better way to subsidize state governments because it is
simple to implement, efficient, equitable, and does not create any
concerns regarding federalism.' The Credit-Equity plan would allow
Congress to set the amount of subsidy it wishes to provide state
governments and to effectively create a set differential between the
interest rates charged for taxable bonds, and the interest which state
governments, would charge on their bonds.

A negative equality factor shows a credit is allowed. If the equality factor is positive,
additional tax liability is incurred.
299. While the 40% taxpayers will have additional tax liability, they should still be
indifferent to purchasing state bonds versus taxable bonds because the after-tax consequences
are equivalent. VARIAN, supra note 30, at 48.
300. See infra text accompanying notes 301-11. But cf. FITCH, supra note 41, at 105-12.
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The Credit-Equity plan also is extremely simple to implement. All
that is required after Congress approves an interest subsidy is to
calculate the equality factor for the different marginal rates. °1 Once
the equality factor is computed, all a taxpayer needs to do is multiply
the appropriate equality factor for their marginal rate by any state bond
interest received. This would determine the amount of credit received or
the amount of increase in tax liability. None of the involved calculations
required by the Fitch plan are present, and Ockham's razor is satisfied.'
Another benefit of this plan is that it would increase the market for
state bonds. As previously stated in this Article, tax-exempt bonds under
section 103 are only attractive to the lower bracket taxpayers if the
interest rate received on them is high.' For example, presently under
section 103, while a 40% bracket taxpayer would be indifferent to the
purchase of a 6% tax-exempt state bond as opposed to a 10% taxable
bond, it would take a 9% tax-exempt state bond to attract a taxpayer in
a 10% marginal tax bracket. The proposed Credit-Equity plan would
make state bonds attractive to taxpayers in all the marginal rates,
thereby increasing the market for state bonds.' If the credit was
refundable to tax-exempt entities such as pension plans and section
501(c) organizations, the demand for state bonds would increase
dramatically.' 5 The increase in demand also would mean that interest
rates might fall. 6 If interest rates were to fall, this would provide an
additional bonus to state governments, and would reduce the credit that
the federal government would have to provide.
The plan also is efficient because the federal government subsidy
would go entirely to the issuing state governments, with none of the
benefit flowing to the higher marginal rate taxpayers. Presently, when
there are not enough purchasers of state bonds in the highest marginal
rate brackets, state governments must increase the interest rates they
provide on their bonds. This means that to attract additional buyers in

301. The equality factor = (R - R') / (1 - R'). See generally BUREAU OF CENSUS, supra
note 7, at 522, No. 804; Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts (for the historic
differential between yields of taxable and tax-exempt bonds).
302. See supra note 276 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 181.
304. The primary purchasers of tax-exempt state bonds are individual households.
Commercial banks and insurance companies are not purchasing as many tax-exempt bonds due
to changes in the interest deduction (§ 265(a)(2)) and the Alternative Minimum Tax (§ 55 et
seq.). See Poterba, supra note 150, at 541.
305. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 145, 147 (1978).
306. This would increase the investment of individual investors who own an increasing
share of the outstanding state bonds. See Feenberg & Poterba, supra note 164, at 2.
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lower tax brackets, state governments must provide higher interest
rates. 30 7 Because state governments cannot specify which marginal
bracket may purchase their bonds, taxpayers in the higher brackets may
receive a windfall benefit. This windfall is lost tax revenue to the
federal government while at the same time providing a smaller subsidy
to state governments. 308
In the Credit-Equity plan, if Congress sets the subsidy at some level,
the state governments would receive a reduction in their borrowing costs
equal to the entire subsidy amount. Taxpayers in the different marginal
rates would receive the same effective taxable bond interest rate, so
none would be favored over another. This makes the plan completely
efficient because all the subsidy would be going to state governments,
rather than to upper-bracket taxpayers whom the federal government has
no reason to subsidize.
The plan is also equitable; it treats all taxpayers the same. Taxpayers
at all the various marginal rates of tax would receive the same equitable
taxable bond rate. 3 9 As shown in Table 3 and Table 4, the comparable
taxable bond interest rate would be the same for all marginal rates, and
the effective interest rate taxpayers would receive on their tax-exempt
bonds would be different.
Another benefit of the Credit-Equity plan is that it would not upset
the method by which tax-exempt bonds are issued.31° State bonds
could be issued according to the same rules and for the same purposes
as they are presently issued, but the Credit-Equity plan would allow for
the state governments to set a lower interest rate on those bonds.
Finally, the Credit-Equity plan would not invoke concerns of
federalism. The Department of the Treasury would not be involved in
affairs of the state governments and would not be required to give any
money to the state governments. 1 In this way, the states and federal
government could maintain a healthy amount of separation and there
should not be any concerns by the state governments that the federal
government might cut off the amount of the subsidy.

307. Or put another way, "since the market yield on tax-exempt bonds will be set by the
marginal investor, the subsidy will cost more to the Treasury than the states and municipalities
will gain in lower interest cost." Orr & MELTZER, supra note 145, at 15-16.
308. See supra text accompanying notes at 145-57.
309. This is what the last columns of Tables 3 and 4 show. Since the effective after-tax rate
is the same for all the different marginal rate taxpayers, the plan is totally vertically equitable.
310. See S. REP. No. 1263, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 146 (1978).
311. See id.
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VII. CONCLUSION

The state bond interest exclusion of section 103 provides for a
federal subsidy to state governments by allowing them to effectively
borrow funds at a reduced interest rate. While the impetus for the state
bond interest exclusion has its historic roots in the doctrine of reciprocal
intergovernmental tax immunity, it is clear that the doctrine would not
apply with the same force or in the same manner today.
The reason for repealing section 103 is to put an end to the
inefficient and inequitable method by which the federal subsidy is
delivered to state governments under that section. Purchasers are
attracted to tax-exempt bonds primarily because the interest received
from the bond equals the after-tax return on a taxable bond. The
inefficiency is due to the fact there are not enough buyers at the highest
marginal tax bracket to whom the bonds are attractive, so state
governments must pay higher interest rates on their bonds. This has two
effects. First, because the bond market is non-differentiated, the bonds
with higher interest rates will be purchased by taxpayers who would
have purchased the bonds at a lower interest rate. This additional
interest received by the higher marginal tax-bracket taxpayers is income
that is lost to the federal government without providing any subsidy to
the state governments. This leads to the second effect-that state
governments receive less and less of a subsidy as the interest rate they
provide on the bonds nears the interest rate given for taxable bonds.
However, this does not mean that the rationale behind section 103 is
wrong. The subsidy on state bonds is something that should be provided
to state governments. The subsidy provides incentive for state governments to fund projects involving public goods." 2 If a federal subsidy
is not provided for projects involving public goods, such goods might
be underprovided by the state governments.
Since the enactment of the exclusion for state bond interest, many
proposals have been suggested for its replacement. These plans were
developed at first because it was not thought politically feasible to
repeal the exclusion without replacing the subsidy. Later, most
economists and legal theorists agreed that the federal subsidy to the state
governments was something that should be continued even after any
repeal of section 103.
One of the first plans suggested was to allow state governments to
sell taxable bonds, and to provide a direct federal interest subsidy to the
states at a set percentage. While this plan gained some support from
state governments, it was eventually killed in Congress. The reason for

312. See supra text accompanying notes 194-96.
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not providing a federal subsidy in this manner is that it goes against the
basic tenets of federalism, in which the state bond interest exclusion has
its roots. While these concerns are not sufficient to prevent its repeal,
the same principles should be invoked to prevent the state governments
from becoming beholden to the federal government for funding projects
that supply public goods.
Another replacement subsidy plan, the Fitch plan, allowed for
taxpayer credits after the increase in gross income by the amount that
would have been included had the taxpayer purchased a taxable bond.
This plan has many merits, chiefly that it decreases the amount of
inefficiency present in the current system. However, the plan is too
complex to implement. Taxpayers would have to make many different
calculations, and in this era of taxpayer revolt, it is unlikely that this
plan would be adopted.
Finally, a Credit-Equity plan has been proposed. It is simple,
efficient, equitable, expands the market for state bonds, and does not
invoke any concerns over federalism. This plan would be accomplished
first by having Congress establish the amount of percentage of interest
savings it wishes to provide to the state governments. After this is done,
an equality factor would be provided for each taxpayer's marginal rate.
The taxpayer would then multiply this against their qualifying state bond
interest. The resulting factor would then either be taken as a credit
against tax, or would increase tax liability.
In the Credit-Equity plan, the entire amount of the federal subsidy
would go to the states and would not be invisibly leaked out to the
wealthy. All taxpayers would receive the same comparable taxable bond
interest rate, so the plan would be equitable. An additional benefit is that
all taxpayers would receive the same comparable taxable bond interest
rate, and consequently the market for state bonds would be expanded
with more taxpayers finding state bonds an attractive investment. This
all would be accomplished without interfering with the balance between
state and federal governments in our system of federalism.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol50/iss1/6

66

Yamamoto: A Proposal for the Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond In
ELIMINATNG THE EXCLUSION FOR STATE BOND INTEREST

APPENDIX
Derivation of the Equality Factor
The objective of the equality factor is to equate tax-exempt and
taxable bond yields for each marginal rate. In Part A, tax-exempt and
taxable bond yields are equated for the marginal rate equal to the
subsidy level. In Part B, the equality is extended to all marginal rates,
so that any taxpayer, not just the taxpayers with marginal rates equal to
the subsidy level, can obtain the same yield from taxable and taxexempt bonds.
Definitions:
B t = taxable bond yield

B X = tax-exempt bond yield
Be = effective bond yield
R = taxpayer marginal rate
R= the taxpayer marginal rate equal to the subsidy set by Congress
Part A
For taxable bonds, tax liability is determined by multiplying the tax
rate (R) and the bond yield (Bt).
tax = R B t

(1)

Hence, for taxable bonds the actual yield ("effective" bond yield or Be)
is the interest received (B) less the tax paid on the interest (R B1). The
following equation expresses this algebraically:
Be

Bt - R Bt

(2)

which can be simplified as
Be

Bt (

1 - R).

(3)

In order to provide the same equivalent yield between a taxable bond
and a tax-exempt bond for a given marginal rate, the tax-exempt bond
interest (B.) could be multiplied by a factor (z) to adjust the bond
interest to the equivalent amount of taxable bond interest:
Bt = B x z
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Combining equations (3) and (4), by substituting the equivalent of B,
from equation (4) into equation (3), we get
Be = B, z (1 - R).

(5)

If the effective bond yield is set equal to the tax-exempt bond yield,
(i.e., if Be = B.), then using equation (5) and replacing Be for B. we get
Be = Be z (1 - R)

(6)

and then divide both sides of the equation by Be to get
1 =z(1-R).

(7)

z = 1 / (1 - R).

(8)

Solving for z we obtain

If R is selected as the subsidy level (R'), z will provide a multiplier
factor such that those taxpayers with a marginal rate R = R' will obtain
equivalent yields from taxable or tax-exempt bonds:
z = 1 / (1 - R).

(9)

Now that we have a factor, z, which equates both taxable and taxexempt yields for a given marginal rate bracket (R) we need to derive
a formula applicable to any given marginal rate of tax. A formula to
accomplish this is derived below in Part B.
Part B
In order for the bonds to be tax-exempt for any given marginal rate
(R) when R is equal to the subsidy level, the tax must be adjusted.
From equation (1) we know that the tax is equal to the taxable bond
yield multiplied by the rate. If we substitute for B, using equation (4) we
can write
tax = R Bt = R BX z.

(10)

Making the tax-exempt bond truly tax exempt can be accomplished by
subtracting a factor from the calculated tax in order to yield zero tax
(where R = R'). Let A be this equalization multiplication factor.
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Let the adjusted tax = R B. z - A B.

(I)

If the adjusted tax is equal to 0 when R = R', and factoring out B1 from
the right hand side of the equation, then

B1 (z R' - A) = 0

(12)

We have two factors multiplied together to equal zero. Since B. is
assumed not zero, then (z R' - A) must be 0 if B. is not, and we can
write

(z R'- A) = 0.

(13)

A = z R'.

(14)

Solving for A we obtain

Using z = I / (1 - R) from equation (9) above, and for the case where
A = [1 / (1 - R)] (R)

(15)

A = R' / (1 - R).

(16)

Using equation (11) again for the tax calculation and using equations (9)
and (16) to substitute for both z and A we get

adjusted tax = B. (z R - A)

(17)

= B, [(1 / (1 - R')) R - (R / (1 - R))]

=B. [(R - R') / (1 - R')].
Therefore the equalityfactor is (R - R) / (1 - R').
The equalityfactor can be used to determine the factor by which the
different marginal brackets can receive the same after-tax benefit on
their bond income. Notice that if (R - R) is positive (i.e., the marginal
rate is greater than the subsidy level R1 ), tax liability is increased; if (R
- R1 ) is negative (i.e., the marginal rate is less than the subsidy level
R'), there is a tax credit. This results in eliminating the excessive profit
of the upper tax bracket and eliminates the penalty of the lower tax
bracket. The formula also will work when a taxpayer's bond income
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crosses into another marginal rate (e.g., due to bond income taxpayer's
marginal rate would go from 30% to 40%). In this care the equality
factor determined for each marginal rate would be used against the bond
income which occurs in that rate. For example, assume the marginal
rates were 30% for income below $40,000 and 40% for all income over
$40,000; a taxpayer's taxable income without bond income was $39,000,
and they had $3000 of bond income ($42,000 total). The equalityfactor
for the 30% bracket would be applied to $1000 (that amoung of bond
income in the 30% bracket) and the remainder ($2000) would have the
equalityfactor for the 40% bracket applied to it.
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